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Wireless channels are vulnerable to interception.  In some applications an end-to-end secure data 
transfer is required.  However the use of cryptographic functions in communication over a wireless 
channel increases sensitivity to channel errors.  As a result, the connection characteristics in terms of 
delay, throughput, and transmission energy worsen.  Transmission energy is a key issue in some 
secure end-to-end wireless applications especially if they are running on mobile handheld devices 
with a limited source of energy such as batteries.  That is why in most secure end-to-end wireless 
connections, the connection is dropped in poor channel conditions.   
In this thesis, models are proposed by which the performance is improved and transmission energy 
can be lowered.  A combination of a cross-layer controller, K Best Likelihood (K-BL) channel 
decoder, and a keyed error detection algorithm in the novel model supports the authorized receivers 
by a higher throughput, lower delay mean, and less transmission energy in a certain range of the 
Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR).  This is done at the expense of additional computation at the receiving 
end.  Ttradeoffs are examined and the simulation results of the new model are compared with those of 
conventional wireless communication systems.   
Another model is devised to mitigate the energy consumption of the Turbo Code channel decoder.  
The overall decoding energy consumption for each packet can be lowered by reducing the average 
number of iterations in the Turbo Code channel decoder.   
The proposed models achieve better energy consumption by reducing the number of iterations in a 
channel decoder that uses the Turbo decoder and by reducing the number of retransmissions in a 
trellis channel decoder.  Furthermore, the security enhancement of the novel models is assessed in 
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We are now in the age of digital information and processing.  Information in the digital format is an 
asset not only to the business community, but also to other sectors of our society.  The entire 
economy and the daily lives of people have become more and more dependent on data provided by 
the Internet, computers, and microprocessors. 
The facilities and flexibilities that are provided by wireless networks have created considerable 
interest in wireless device usage.  The wireless networks can typically provide easy access but are 
also characterized by slow transmission and lower accuracy.  One does not need to be reminded of the 
importance of speed of transmission and accuracy of the transferred or processed information in 
wireless networks.  Efficient methods and techniques are developed to manage, process, store, and 
transfer the digital information in wireless networks to achieve acceptable performance. 
However, achieving such performance is not easy in wireless networks.  The quality of a wireless 
connection changes frequently due to the variations in the surroundings.  Routing through mobile 
nodes causes considerable variation in network topology, traffic loads, and channel conditions. As a 
result, it is difficult to support different applications.  The link state metrics such as delay, bandwidth, 
jitter, packet loss rate, bit error rate, and throughput must be continuously monitored.  Some of these 
metrics can be managed to achieve an optimal performance in the specific conditions.   
However, getting and managing such link state information in a wireless network is not easy.  In 
practice, there is a need for different levels of Quality of Service (QoS) in order to prioritize the 
parameters of an application.  For instance, the vital parameter for Voice over IP (VoIP), real time 
image application and remote sensing  [1]- [3] is delay; for telephony and video  [4] [5] is jitter, for 
banking and stock information  [6] [8] is security, for purchasing and file transferring is high accuracy, 
and for most networks of battery-powered devices such as sensor networks is energy consumption.     
Some applications are very sensitive to delay.  Almost all real-time applications are in this 
category, including video conferencing, real-time voice, real-time sensing (remote surgery), data base 
updating, and security cameras.  Furthermore, applications that deal with financial information or 
health care data require a certain level of privacy.  In these categories, some applications require 
authentication and encryption services, whereas others require only one of them  [9].  Furthermore, 
handheld devices are typically powered by batteries, and energy conservation techniques need to be 
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applied.   
For wireless network applications, the combination of the characteristics of the environment, 
network, and application drives the performance.  The environment in which mobile devices are 
randomly distributed, changes constantly, affecting the communication channel parameters.  An 
example of the time variance effect on a channel is fading, caused by shadowing or multi-path.  Also, 
the addition or loss of a device affects the interference level of communication channel.  An 
application often requires shared limited resources such as energy or processing power, which, in 
turn, influences other applications.  Therefore, the application’s requirements can change the 
requirements of the connection.   
Another example of the effects of an application is the increased sensitivity to error when a secure 
link is required on a wireless connection.  Security functions such as confidentiality, authentication, 
and digital signatures increase the overhead of the channel and decrease the throughput.  Moreover, 
the sensitivity of the connection to channel errors is increased; a single residual bit error in a received 
block of encrypted information can render the entire block unreadable  [10]- [12].  This sensitivity is 
magnified within the constraints of a wireless channel.   
Frequently, the network condition or the connection quality deteriorates so much that a viable 
performance is impossible.  In most secure wireless connections, the connection is dropped in the 
harsh environments  [13] [14]. 
As wireless network usage expands, there is a need to support different applications on the same 
network.  As a result, the network must change the sensitivity level of the parameters according to the 
application running at the time.  It is possible that in one moment the link supports an application 
which is highly sensitive to jitter, but, at another moment the running application is more sensitive to 
accuracy.  A network can be designed for a specific application in a certain environment, but it may 
not perform acceptably or maintain the quality for different environments.   
There are different techniques to maintain the quality of communication when the channel 
condition varies.  One way is to change the design so that the important parameters can be monitored 
and controlled.  Another solution can be that a controller changes some parameters in the system to 
maintain the communication quality. 
Almost all the protocols in wireless communication depend on feedback information to meet the 




Collision detection is a well-known technique that is largely employed in wireless protocols  [15].  
It is implemented in the physical layer of wireless communication systems.  The recent transmitted 
packet is retransmitted on detection of a collision in the shared communication channel.  The collision 
indicates that the shared communication channel is being used by another transmitter during the 
transmission of the packet.   
The rate of collision is used to change the transmission power.  It has been shown  [16] that with 
this technique, the average transmission delay is lower than that of other techniques.  Also, the 
average network power consumption can be reduced.  More details about how to use the collision 
occurrence rate to lower power consumption can be found in  [17]- [19].  
At the receiver end, the Automatic Repeat reQuest (ARQ) techniques are implemented in the 
transport layer to ensure the quality of received information  [20].  Such techniques use an error 
detection process to decide if the received packet needs to be resent.  In a system with ARQ, the 
receiver returns one bit of information for each received packet to the sender to indicate the 
acceptance or rejection of the packet.  For instance, Lu et al.  [21] and Zorzi et al.  [24] studied the 
throughput of different implementations of the Go-Back-N and Selective-Repeat ARQ. 
Furthermore, more information about the channel state and the quality of the received packet can 
be returned to the sender to let it adaptively adjust the information format and transmission 
parameters.  The Channel State Information (CSI) is sent back along with the packet 
acknowledgement to obtain a better performance in  [25]- [28]. 
In many systems, a combination of error detection and correction techniques is used to handle the 
channel errors.  This is called Hybrid ARQ (HARQ) [20].  To reduce the mean delay in mobile 
wireless communication, a truncated HARQ type II  [25] [26] has been studied in  [27].  The idea of 
error control coding with a finite number of retransmissions has been introduced with more emphasis 
on the delay in  [28].  In this technique the sender sends the error detection parity bits along with the 
original message.  Upon the retransmission request, the sender transmits the error correction parity 
bits only once or twice.  It is shown that it is possible to improve the delay characteristics of the 
connection  [27]. 
M. Zorzi and R. Rao have described the use of an adaptive error control protocol with the                
Go-back-N ARQ technique in energy constrained systems  [29].  They have studied the characteristics 
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of the power provided by batteries, and analyzed the energy consumption of their adaptive error 
control technique, and compared it to the energy used in the original Go-back-N ARQ protocol. 
The idea of reducing the transmission energy helps to extend the battery life of mobile battery-
powered devices.  One of the solutions to the channel fading problem is the Code Division Multiple 
Access (CDMA) systems.  Their performance is directly affected by the level of noise in the channel.  
As a multiple access technique, most of the noise in the channel is generated by other transmitters.  
This explains why the signal power to the interference power ratio is so crucial in CDMA systems.  
Many studies indicate that lowering the power transmission in this technique reduces the level of the 
interference in the channel (for the other receivers).  Zhuang and Kim et al. have explained that how 
CDMA networks achieve the lower level of the interference by reducing network’s transmission 
energy, while the performance is maintained  [30] [31]. 
To reduce the transmission energy in CDMA systems by using Hybrid ARQ  [31], the 
acknowledgement packets contain Eb/Nt (transmission energy per bit to interference noise density in 
working bandwidth ratio) information to control the sender’s transmission power.  As a result, the 
sender’s energy consumption is reduced by not sending packets with more than the needed power.  At 
the same time, the level of the interference noise in the working bandwidth (Nt) is dropped for the 
other receivers.  The technique can result in less overall network energy consumption and a lower 
delay mean. 
There has been much research on power management techniques in wireless connections.  Each 
technique is developed to reduce the energy consumption and to extend the battery life.  It is shown 
that how these techniques affect the other connection/network parameters such as interference 
 [32] [33], delay  [34]- [36], reliability  [37]- [40], and throughput  [41] [42]. 
A combined scheme for power and error control, recently proposed by N. Arulselvan and R. Berry 
 [37], can reduce the energy consumption and the probability of error. 
There are different approaches to reduce energy consumption and some require carefully 
compromising some parameters since they do not always lead to a desirable performance.  The 
decision to make this compromise depends on the application and is performed by a controller.  For 
example, M. N. Smadi and B. Szabados  [43]- [45] have shown that the packet size can be adapted to 
the channel condition to achieve higher throughput and a lower delay.  Also, an adaptive Forward 
Error Correction (FEC) technique has been studied  [43] [46]- [48] to increase the reliability of the 
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channel during dynamic changes.  
Recently, a cross-layer approach to optimize communication performance has attracted a great deal 
of attention.  B. G. Lee et al.  [49] have introduced an energy efficient and reliable method for a 
wireless sensor network.   
In this thesis the idea of cross-layer control unit has been adopted to improve energy efficiency and 
performance.  The controller optimizes the number of retransmission request by monitoring the 
information flow through different blocks and layers.  A combination of a cross-layer controller, 
multi-output channel decoder, and a keyed error detection algorithm results in the authorized 
receivers realizing higher throughput, lower delay mean, and less energy consumption in a certain 
range of Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR). 
A model is proposed to achieve a higher aggregate throughput over a certain range of residual 
channel error rates in secure end-to-end wireless connections.  This is done at the expense of 
additional computational power at the receiving ends.  These tradeoffs and the simulation results for 
the novel models are compared with those of conventional wireless communication systems.  The 
newly devised model has lower retransmission rates which result in less energy consumption on 
transmission.  The novel model also acquires a higher throughput and a less delay mean compared 
with those of the basic models in certain SNRs.   
In addition, the efficiency of the proposed cross-layer controller and the advantage of the controller 
in terms of throughput and reliability in a range of SNR are explored.  By using this cross-layer 
controller, a battery-powered device can still receive the information in the range of an acceptable 
delay mean and jitter.  The cross-layer controller expands the acceptable performance of the model 
into lower SNR region.  The model’s improvement is achieved at the expense of additional 
computation at the receiving end.   
The model is best used in the application were the cost of transmission energy is higher than the 
receiver’s processing.  In applications such as deep space communications, Wireless Sensor Networks 
(WSN), the proposed model can extend the battery life of the transmitter by reducing the energy 
consumption in transmission.   
In another approach to reduce the energy consumption, the focus is on the extensive computing of 
the Turbo Code channel decoder.  The overall decoding energy consumption for each packet can be 
lowered by reducing the average number of iterations in a Turbo code channel decoder.  Battail et al. 
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 [50] and Moher et al.  [51] have demonstrated that the cross entropy is an important stop criterion in 
an iterative decoding algorithm.  To reduce the number of decoding iterations in Turbo decoder, 
Hagenauer et al.  [52] have introduced a cross entropy metric.  Also, the similarity of the decoded 
block in consecutive iterations is used to detect the sufficiency of the decoding process  [53].  In this 
thesis, a simple error detection algorithm, proposed by A. Banerjee et al.  [54], is adopted to control 
the number of iterations in the Turbo decoder.  The error detection algorithm is combined with 
security functions to enhance the privacy protection of the communication from a listening attack. 
In applications such as personal wireless network or wireless sensor network where the wireless 
devices are supposed to work in a harsh environment such as, busy intersections, inside tornados, or 
crowded office spaces, the proposed model extends the battery life of the devices by using lower 
processing energy per bit. 
The proposed models in the thesis convey an improved energy-consumption by reducing the 
number of iterations in a channel decoder using Turbo decoder and by reducing the number of 
retransmissions in a trellis channel decoder.  Furthermore, the security enhancement of the proposed 
models and the point at which the enhancement is established is investigated. 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 is a review of the fundamental concepts of 
the techniques examined in the thesis in terms of achieving a better performance.  In Chapter 3 the 
proposed models are introduced and details of the cross-layer control unit, controlling algorithm, flow 
of the information, and controlling signals are looked at.  In addition, base models with conventional 
techniques and algorithms are described.  The performances of the proposed models are compared to 
those of the base model later in Chapter 4.  The simulation results in different channels are also 
discussed and the way the proposed models can achieve better energy consumption in range of Signal 
to Noise Ratio is demonstrated.  Furthermore, the proposed models’ security enhancement of the 
communication and protection against listening attacks are discussed.  Chapter 5 provides the 







Typically, wireless channels are subject to more problems than wired communication channels.  
Wireless channels are severely constrained by bandwidth limitations and bear rapid time-variant 
characteristics; mobile devices are usually constrained by extra limitations such as energy and 
processing capability caused by mobility, size, and weight limitations.  The efficiency of the data 
transfer and the quality of the communication are significantly affected by these constraints.  For 
example, the requirements for the hardware in terms of size, weight, and energy consumption on 
handheld battery-powered devices have severely restricts the employment of powerful processors, 
which in turn, limits the use of efficient algorithms due to their complexity. 
Changes in the transmitter or receiver’s location, speed, or direction; variations in the environment 
temperature; and the movements of nearby objects directly affect the characteristics of a wireless 
channel.  This explains why the models that are viable for the wired channels are not viable for 
wireless channels.  Due to the nature of wireless channels, the main characteristics of the channel 
vary rapidly over time, directly affecting the communication efficiency. 
In this chapter the techniques and algorithms are reviewed of which are used in the proposed 
models.  Also, the typical methods that are used to achieve a better performance in a communication 
over a wireless channel are explained.   
2.1.1 Wireless Channel Modelling 
There has been substantial research in the field of wireless communication channel modelling.  The 
best models that fit a general wireless channel are fading models.  In digital communications, the time 
required to transmit a symbol is called the symbol time  [55].  If the symbol time is smaller than the 
average period of change, the characteristics of the channel are likely to be the same for several 
adjacent symbols and the channel is classified as slow fading.  But if the rate of changes is close to 
the symbol time, the channel is classified as fast fading  [56]. 



















Time-variant characteristics of the channel, along with the resource constraints, reduce the 
reliability of transmissions over wireless channels.  The reliability of a communication system is 
measured by the average number of errors in the receiver. 
There are several error control techniques to overcome wireless channels’ problems  [57].  One 
technique that is used to increase the reliability of the channels in digital communication is the error 
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handling technique  [58].  There are several methods to implement error handling techniques, 
depending on the channel being simplex (one-way) or duplex (two-way)  [56]. 
2.2 Error Handling Techniques 
Error Control Coding (ECC) depends on controlled redundancy to detect or correct errors in the 
receiver.  The requirements of the system (e.g., throughput, error rate, delay, and jitter) and the nature 
of the channel (e.g., bandwidth, fading, mobility, level of noise, and interference) play a major role in 
the selection of the error handling technique. 
The block diagram in Figure  2.2 illustrates a simplex communication channel.  The flow of data is 
strictly in one direction, from transmitter to receiver, or from the recording unit to the replaying 
device.  Error control for a one-way system is accomplished by using the Forward Error Correction 
(FEC).  This means that the receiver uses the arithmetic or algebraic structure of the code to 
determine what the original message is, given the (erroneous) received word.   
FEC improves the error correction capacity of a system by adding some carefully designed 
redundant information to the data sent through the channel.  The process of adding information is 
known as channel coding  [20] and is categorized in two main groups: convolutional coding and block 
coding.  Convolutional codes manipulate serial data, one or a few bits at a time.  Block codes operate 
on relatively large blocks of data (typically, up to a couple of hundred bytes).  There are a variety of 
useful convolutional and block codes and different coding and decoding algorithms to efficiently 
recover the original message from the received information  [57]- [59]. 
Examples of FEC systems include magnetic tape storage systems in which the information 
recorded on tape can be replayed weeks or even months after it is recorded.  Another example is deep 
space communications, where the round-trip delay (the time interval in which a message that has 
been sent from the transmitter, comes back again from the receiver) is too long and retransmission is 
not possible.  Many systems in use today employ some form of FEC, even if the channel is not 





Figure  2.2  Block diagram of a typical one-way data transmission or storage system one-way 
channel, and the usage of FEC 
 
Error control for a two-way system is accomplished by using error detection and retransmission, 
called the Automatic Repeat reQuest (ARQ).  In an ARQ system, the receiver uses an error detection 
technique to detect errors in the receiving messages.  The required information to distinguish a correct 
message from an incorrect one is added to the message before transmission.  When the error(s) are 
detected at the receiver, a request is sent through the return channel to the sender.  In order to ask for 
a specific message to be retransmitted in some ARQ systems, the messages carry an identifier.  The 
error avoidance unit in the sender then transmits the requested message again by using the identifier.  
This can continue until the message is received correctly by the receiver  [60]. 
Figure  2.3 shows the block diagram of a system using ARQ in a duplex channel. 
In many systems, a combination of error detection and correction techniques is adopted to handle 
the channel errors, as shown in Figure  2.4, and is referred as Hybrid ARQ (HARQ).   The structure of 
the HARQ system is similar to that of the ARQ system, but for the receiver.  After the message is 
received, an error correction algorithm is employed to recover all the errors.  Then the error detection 
algorithm checks if there are any more errors in the message.  If so, a request for retransmission is 





















Figure  2.3  Two-way transmission system using ARQ 
 
 
Figure  2.4  Two-way transmission system using HARQ 
 
In the next few sections, the concept of error correction and error detection techniques are 
discussed, and the structure of the implemented code are described. 
2.2.1 Forward Error Correction (FEC) 
Error correction is based on the Hamming distance of code words.  Figure  2.5 is an example of an 
error correction technique for code words with 21 bits of free distance (dfree = 21 bits).  If the 
transmitter sends one of these two code words, the receiver can perform error correction on the 
received words.  The correction process corrects the word to the code word with the maximum 
probability of being transmitted, given the received word, which corresponds to the code word with 
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Figure  2.5  Correction of received code using ECC 
 
received word 2 are corrected to code word 1 and code word 2, respectively.  Of course, if the 
received word contains more error bits than the correction ability of the code (here 10 bits), the 
receiver is not capable of correctly recovering the message. 
2.2.2 Automatic Repeat Request (ARQ) Technique 
The principle of the ARQ technique is based on detecting the error(s) in the received block by adding 
extra bits, called parity bits, to the transmitted block.  They are chosen in a way in which their values 
are highly correlated with the contents of the block.  The error in the received block is detected by 
regenerating the parity bits in the receiver, and comparing them with the received parity bits.  If any 
of the bits are decoded incorrectly, it is very likely to be detected  [60].  The implementation of error 
detection is represented in Figure  2.6. 
An example of error detection is shown in Figure  2.7.  If the received word is not a valid code 
word, the receiver can conclude that it contains some error bits and requests for retransmission.  Any 
error which does not change a valid code word to another can be detected by this technique.  Then 
again, if the noise of the channel changes the transmitted code word to another valid code word, the 
error cannot be detected by this technique. 
There are two types of ARQ systems: stop-and-wait ARQ and continuous ARQ  [59].  With stop-
and-wait ARQ, the transmitter sends a code word to the receiver and waits for a positive (ACK) or 
negative (NAK) acknowledgement from the receiver (Figure  2.8).  If an ACK is received (no error 
detected), the transmitter sends the next code word.  If an NAK is received (errors detected), the  
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Figure  2.8  Stop-and-wait ARQ  
 
Figure  2.6  Error detection using parity bits implementation in sender and receiver 
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transmitter resends the preceding c istent, the same code word might 
ver continuously and 
re
ely, the transmitter might simply resend only those code words that are negatively 
ac ient 
 throughput enhancement in time-varying mobile channel 
en
ode word.  When the noise is pers
be transmitted several times before it is correctly received and acknowledged.   
With the continuous ARQ, the transmitter sends code words to the recei
ceives acknowledgements continuously.  When NAK is received, the transmitter begins a 
retransmission.  It can back up to the code word in error and resend that word plus the words that 
follow it.  This is called go-back-N ARQ (Figure  2.9).  In such a system, the acknowledgement for a 
code arrives after a round-trip delay, defined as the time interval between the transmission of a code 
and the receipt of an acknowledgment for that code.  During this interval, N-1 other codes are also 
transmitted.  When a NAK is received, the transmitter backs up to the code that is negatively 
acknowledged and resends it and N-1 succeeding code words that are transmitted during the round-
trip delay.   
Alternativ
knowledged.  This is known as selective-repeat ARQ, shown in Figure  2.10, and is more effic
than go-back-N ARQ, but requires more logic and buffering; that is, as the receiver must be able to 
reassemble the memory blocks in order. 
ARQ schemes are quite effective for
vironments.  The continuous ARQ is more efficient than stop-and-wait ARQ, but it is also more 
complex.  In a satellite communication system where the transmission rate is high and the round-trip 
delay is long, continuous ARQ is often used.  Stop-and-wait ARQ is used in systems where the time 
taken to transmit a code word is long compared to the time taken to receive an acknowledgment  [59]. 
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hree 
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  2.10 eat A
In many systems, incl
combined to handle the channel errors.  This is called Hybrid ARQ (HARQ) and is composed of t
types of HARQ.   
For type I HAR
me code word.  In these systems, after the receiver decodes the error-correction code, it checks if 
the block still has an error using the error-detection decoder.  Figure  2.11 depicts type I Hybrid ARQ 
systems work.  Depending on the region that the received word is in; it is either corrected to a code 
word or detected as an erroneous word.  Although this scheme is much less complex, it is an 
inefficient method of implementing ARQ.  In fact, the main disadvantage of type I HARQ is that 
negative acknowledged packets are retransmitted entirely.   
In type II and type III HARQ, after receiving a negative ac
fferent bits, instead of simply repeating the same block.  The information in the retransmitted 
can be used to recover more errors in the original block.  Therefore, the information from the first 
block is used, along with the new parity bits, to recover the errors.  A simple way to implement the
type II HARQ is to send the original message with error-detection on the first transmission and send
the error-correction parity bits after the negative acknowledgement are received (Figure  2.12).  If the 
receiver detects an error in the first block, the receiver uses the additional information of the second 
transmission to recover the original message.  The difference between type II HARQ and type III 
HARQ is that the information in each retransmission block is different in type III HARQ.  These 
schemes require additional complexity at the transmitter than the Type I HARQ, because packets 




iques, the HARQ technique generally 
im
orrectio ved codes using ECC 
dfree (bits) 
Figure  2.12 illustrates the different types of H
Since HARQ schemes benefit from both FEC and ARQ techn
proves the performance of the system in terms of the accuracy and delay.  More details on HARQ 
can be found in the literature  [59] [60]. 
 
 
Figure  2.11  Detec
Code Word 2   
(n bits) 
Code Word 1   
(n bits) 
Correction to 
Code Word 1 
Correction to 





tion and c n of recei
 
17 
Transmission Type I  HARQ 
Parity Bits Original Block 
 
Figure  2.12  Different types of Hybrid ARQ schemes 
 
In next section, some code structures that are used for detection and correction in FEC and ARQ 
systems are described. 
2.2.4 Code Structure 
The structure of the codes that are used in ECC systems is exemplified.  For simplicity, it is assumed 
that the source of information are blocks of k-bit binary messages.  Consequently, there are M=2k 
possible blocks, which are called block messages or blocks of information.  A block code consists of 
a set of fixed-length vectors, called code words whose length n is the number of code elements in the 
vector.  Since the elements of a code word are selected from the binary alphabet, there are 2n possible 
words.  From these, M=2k words are selected (k<n) to form code words.  A block of k information 
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ratio Rc=k/n is defined to be the code rate.  Thus, each ECC system selects a subset of M=2k code 
words of n-bit length to transmit a k-bit message block  [59] [60].   
Besides the code rate parameter, Rc, an important parameter of a code word is its Hamming weight, 
which is simply the number of nonzero elements that it contains.  A measure of the differences in the 
code words is the number of corresponding elements or positions in which they differ.  This measure 
is the Hamming distance between the two code words  [59] [60]. 
If the original message block appears in code word (n, k), the code is systematic  [59] [60].  In 
systematic codes, n–k redundant bits are added to each message to form a code word.  The redundant 
bits provide the code with the capability of detecting and/or correcting some channel errors.  The 
redundant bits, parity bits, are best chosen if the code words have the maximum Hamming distance 
from each other.  The minimum of the Hamming distance between any two code words is called  free 
distance and is denoted by dfree.  A code with a free distance of dfree is capable of correcting up to 
t=(dfree–1)/2 random bit errors in each code word.  Also, the code can be used to detect up to dfree–1 
random bit errors in each erroneous code word. 
To show all the important parameters, binary block codes with k bits message length, n bits code 
words length, and free distance of dfree are denoted by (n, k, dfree). 
There has been much work done on finding block codes with good properties. Some examples are 
given in Table  2.1  [59] [62] [63]. 
The codes in Table  2.1 are called block codes, because a fixed size block of k-bit data is examined 
to compute the required error control bits.  There are applications, such as audio and video with a 
continuous data stream, which the block codes are not suitable unless the data is chopped in k-bit 
blocks.  In these cases, convolutional codes are well suited for error control purposes  [64].   
Typically, convolutional codes are described by two parameters: the code rate and the constraint 
length.  The code rate, Rc=k/n, is expressed as a ratio of the number of bits in the convolutional 
encoder (k) to the number of channel symbols output by the convolutional encoder (n) in a given 
encoder cycle.  The other parameter is m which indicates how many cycles an input bit is retained and 
used for encoding, after it first appears at the input to the convolutional encoder.  The m parameter 
can be thought of as the memory length of the encoder. 
Figure  2.13 illustrates a convolutional encoder that is implemented by a two-bit memory, where the 
relations between the source input and the encoder outputs sequence are exhibited. 
 
19 
Table  2.1  Some binary block codes and their properties implemented on GF (2m) 
Name of the code n (bits) k (bits) dfree (bits) 
Original Hamming 2m-1 n-m 3 
Extended Hamming 2m n-m 4 
BCH* 2m-1 n-mt≤  2t+1≤  
RS** m(2m-1) n-2mt m(2t+1) 
All codes are defined in the extended binary field GF(2m) 
* BCH : Bose, Chaudhuri and Hocquenghem codes; t is the maximum bits that are correctable 
** RS : Reed-Solomon codes; t is the maximum bits that are correctable 
 
The redundancy, added by the parity bits, is used to detect the errors in the code words (error 
detection) and/or recover the original information (error correction) by different methods. 
In communications, parity checking refers to the use of parity bits to check that the data is 
transmitted accurately.  On the receiver end, the device checks each block to ensure that it has 
matching parity bits.  If there is a mismatch, the receiver knows there is an error during transmission. 
The sender and receiver must both agree regarding parity checking and the set of code words used.  
If the two ends are not configured with the same code word set, communication is impossible.   
There are many other more sophisticated protocols for ensuring transmission accuracy such as 
MNP  [65] and CCITT V.42  [66].  Parity checking is used not only in communications but also to test 
memory storage devices.  Many PCs, for example, perform a parity check on the memory every time 
a byte of data is read.   
Output1
 







Figure  2.14  Trellis diagram of the convolutional encoder in Figure  2.13 
2.3 Trellis Coded Modulation (TCM) 
The innovative aspect of Trellis Coded Modulation (TCM) is that convolutional encoding and 
modulation  [67] are viewed as one operation.  Therefore, the received signal is processed by 
combining the demodulation and decoding in a single step, instead of being first demodulated and 
then decoded.  Consequently, the parameter governing the performance of the transmission system 
over the channel is not the free Hamming distance of the convolutional code words but is the free 
Euclidean distance  [64] between the transmitted signal sequences.  The key to this integrated 
modulation and coding approach is to form an effective method for mapping the coded bits into signal 
points such that the minimum Euclidean distance is maximized.  Such a method has been developed 
by Ungerboeck (1982), based on the principle of mapping by set partitioning  [68]. 
Typically, the TCM encoder consists of a convolutional encoder cascaded to a memory-less 
mapper.  The signal transmitted at each discrete time depends not only on the source symbol at the 
same time instant, but also on a finite number of the previous source symbols (Figure  2.13). 
A convenient way of describing a set of signal sequences is by a trellis diagram  [64].  The distance 
properties of a TCM scheme can now be studied in the same way as those of convolutional codes.  
The memory state and outputs in Figure  2.13 reflects the function of the input and current memory 
state of the encoder by using the trellis diagram in Figure  2.14. 
For binary convolutional codes, TCM schemes have an underlying trellis structure that can be 
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th Viterbi decoding is an FEC technique, and is employed in the TCM 
between the signal sequences and paths traversing 
th
nel 
se of the noise, the chosen path might not coincide with the correct path.  That is, the path 
traced by the sequence of source symbols, but occasionally diverges from it and remerges at a later 
tim
  2.13, If the sequence 10010 is sent to the receiver, it 
is encoded to 11 00 10 11 01 and transmitted.  Figure  2.15 illustrates the correct path in the ML 
re
 
ng TCM  
Convolutional encoding wi
decoder.  Due to the one-to-one correspondence 
e trellis, Maximum-Likelihood (ML) decoding is adopted to search for the trellis path with the 
minimum Euclidean distance to the received signal sequence.  The optimum decoding is the search 
for the most likely path through the trellis tree once the received sequence is observed at the chan
output. 
Becau
e (Figure  2.15).  The diverging and remerging time depends on the noise/fading level of the 
channel at the time of the symbol transmission. 
Considering the convolutional coder in Figure
ceiver.  If the noise in the channel changes the transmitted sequence and the ML receiver sees 11 11 
10 10 01 at the output of the channel, it decodes the sequence as 11110 which minimizes the 
Euclidian distance to the received sequence. 
 
 

























Path of correct sequence 




  Viterbi decoding was introduce n, many researchers have 
extended his work by finding good convolutional codes, exploring the performance limits of the 
idered.  
tain bit error probability between a system with the channel 
co
ation provides an effective method for trading off the 
ba
2.4 Turbo Codes 
In 1993, Turbo Codes  [72] were first introduced and have provided significant improvements in the 
her channel codes.  Turbo codes use two Recursive Convolutional (RC) 
ation is conducted over a fading 
ch
 
o another MAP decoder for the next decoding 
ite
 
d by Andrew J. Viterbi  [69].  Since the
technique, and varying the decoder design parameters to optimize the implementation of the 
technique in hardware and software  [70]. 
To measure the improvement of the system by using channel codes, the coding gain is cons
The difference in the SNR to achieve a cer
der and the same system without the channel coder is coding gain  [59].  TCM allows the system to 
achieve the Bit Error Rate with a lower transmission power.  Therefore the power saving for the TCM 
(in decibels) is expressed by its coding gain. 
However, there is a cost; the increased bandwidth of the transmitted signal and, of course, higher 
receiver complexity  [67].  Thus, coded modul
ndwidth and implementation complexity for the transmission power.  This situation is especially 
important for digital communication systems that are designed to operate in the energy limited 
regions.  TCM finds applications on bandwidth limited channels such as voice-band telephone, 
terrestrial microwave, satellite and mobile channels  [71]. 
 
coding gain over the ot
encoders  [73], separated by an interleaver, for encoding and multiple iterations of the Maximum A-
posterior Probability (MAP) algorithm, as seen in Figure  2.16  [55]. 
Turbo Codes significantly outperform conventional codes, and rely on interleavers to reduce the 
effect of burst errors.  This is particularly important when communic
annel where burst errors happen more frequently. 
On the receiver end, the distinctive characteristic of the Turbo Code is the use of iterative decoding,
in which the results of one MAP decoder are passed t
ration, as depicted in Figure  2.16.  The iteration process is useful in sharing the information from 
one decoding to another.  The first decoder does not have the information from the second decoder 
output in the first iteration.  Then, the output of the second decoder provides feedback into the input 
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Figure  2.17  Bit Error Rate vs. SNR for two block sizes N=130, and 1024 bits and the 
number of iterations of I=4, and 8 
 
of the first decoder.  Thus, the firs he second iteration, and the 
decoding performance should improve.  Intuitively, with more iterations the error probability 
us 
















t decoder has more information in t
decreases in Turbo Code decoder. 
Figure  2.17 offers a comparison of the Bit Error Rate performance of a Turbo Code for vario
block sizes and decoding iterations
ming the channel is subject to Additive White Gaussian Noise channel (AWGN). 
In Figure  2.17, it is evident that performance improves as the length of the blocks (N) and the 





oder.  The overall decoding energy consumption for each packet can 
be
ion Reduction Techniques 
Battail et al.  [50] and Moher et al.  [51] have reported that the cross entropy is an important criterion 
er et al.  [52] have introduced a cross entropy metric to 
 not 
n their approach, the results of the decoders are transformed to bits by 
ha  
coders, and they have more information about the input, resulting in more accurate decisions.  
impact of this extra information, though, decreases as the number of iterations increases, since the 
decoders have already exchanged whatever information is useful to the decoding process  [74].  This 
implies that, beyond a certain point, more iterations do not improve the error performance and only
lengthens the decoding time.  It is also noteworthy that the decoding time increases as the number of 
decoding iterations increase.   
To further reduce the energy consumption, researchers focus on the complex computing processes 
of the Turbo Code channel dec
 lowered by reducing the average number of iterations in a Turbo code channel decoder.  The 
methods which are used to reduce the number of iterations in Turbo Code channel decoder are now 
introduced. 
2.4.1 Iterat
in the iterative decoding algorithm.  Hagenau
reduce the number of decoding iterations in the Turbo decoder.  They have used the log likelihood 
ratio, and the extrinsic value of each bit at each iteration to approximate the cross entropy of the 
whole block.  If the cross entropy of the probability distribution between the two decoders at each 
iteration drops below a certain threshold, the decoder concludes that running more iterations does
recover more accurate bits.   
To stop the iteration in the Turbo Code channel decoder, J. Hamorsky and U. Wachsmann  [53] 
have used different criteria.  I
rd decisions at the end of each iteration.  The block of data which consists of these bits is compared
to the last iteration’s block.  The authors suggest the decoder can stop the decoding process if the 
block values do not change in ithershold consecutive iterations.  The value of ithershold can be adaptively 
changed according to channel condition to increase the efficiency of the technique, as signified in 





Figure  2.18  Iteration stop criteria using the similarity of the decoded block in  ithershold consecutive 




A. Banerjee et al.  [54] have proposed a simple error detection algorithm, similar to CRC check, to 
control the number of iterations in the Turbo decoder.  The iteration stops when the error detection 
algorithm finds no error in the decoded block.  In Chapter 3, the error detection algorithm is 
combined with the security functions to enhance the privacy protection of the communication from a 
listening attack. 
The interleaver is one of the essential components in the Turbo code design, and is also used to 
permute the data bits in the transmitted block so that the channel noise spreads over all the data 
blocks.  The error correction technique use in the Turbo Code can recover data more effectively, 
when the noise effect randomly moved in the code. 
The next section is devoted to the interleaver and how it is adopted to recover data in the blocks 
with burst errors. 
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Most of the well-known codes, which have been devised for increasing reliability in the transmission 
of information, are effective when the errors caused by the channel are statistically independent.  
However, there are channels that exhibit bursty error characteristics  [55].  One example is the class of 
wireless channels characterized by multi-path and fading.  Signal fading, due to time-variant multi-
path propagation, often causes the signal to fall below the noise level, thus resulting in a large number 
of consecutive errors.  This is the case for the fading channels which are examples of memory-
channels.  It is assumed that a slow fading channel exhibits fades with durations that exceed the time 
required to transmit several channel symbols.  Thus, a fade that affects one channel symbol is very 
likely to affect a number of adjacent channel symbols.  As a consequence, slow fading transmission 
errors often occur in bursts.  A second example is the class of magnetic recording channels (tape or 
disk) in which the defects in the recording media result in clusters of errors.  Usually, they are not 
corrected by codes that are optimally designed for statistically independent random errors. 
Most block codes and convolutional codes are efficient at random-error correcting.  A random 
error-correcting code corrects up to t symbols per code word, regardless of their placement in the 
code word.  An error burst consists of several symbol errors within a small number of received code 
words.  The error-correction capacity, required to correct these bursts, is large and is included in 
blocks that are not affected by the burst.  However, this is inefficient in terms of overhead.   
Therefore, a sophisticated error control scheme must be capable of correcting both random and 
burst errors.  Many communication systems contain ARQs along with FECs.  Such a Hybrid ARQ is 
a potential solution, but requires a feedback channel.  The disadvantage of introducing a variable 
information rate to the system is the fact that the retransmission rate is dependent on channel errors 
and characteristics which are random time variables.  However, for some applications such as a 
compact-disc player, digital radio, or television broadcasting, where ARQ is not applicable, 
alternative techniques to ARQ are needed to handle burst errors that do not require a feedback 
channel.  Much effort has gone into the development of codes or coding techniques that can 
specifically deal with channel burst errors.  Probably one of the best known burst error correcting 
codes is the subclass of cyclic codes, called Fire codes, named after P. Fire  [75], who discovered 
them.  Another class of cyclic codes for burst error correction has been subsequently discovered by 
Burton  [76].   
In a one-way channel, the combination of the FEC technique with interleaving, as depicted in 
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Figure  2.19, is a solution for handling burst errors  [57].  It should be noted that interleaving does not 
change the constant throughput of a FEC system, but does produce an additional delay. 
An interleaver reorders the channel-encoded symbols, before transmitting them over the channel.  
This operation is neutralized or reversed by the deinterleaver at the receiver before the channel 
decoding.  If the parameters of the interleaver are chosen properly with respect to the channel 
characteristics, the reordering results in a spread of burst errors over a long time interval in the 
channel-encoded symbol sequence.  Such errors then appear as random single errors to the error 
correction block as signified in Figure  2.20.  However, the resulting additional transmission delay for 
such a system can become quite long, if a large interleaver is used.   
A burst of errors of length b is defined as a sequence of b-bit errors, the first and last of which are 
1s.  The burst error correction capability of a code is defined as one less than the length of the shortest 
uncorrectable burst.  It is relatively easy to show that a systematic (n, k) block code, which has n-k 
parity check bits, can correct bursts of length b < [(n-k)/2] . 
An effective method for dealing with burst error channels is to interleave the coded data in such a 
way that the bursty channel is transformed into a channel with independent errors.  Thus, a code  
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Figure  2.20  Breaking the burst error to correctable size by interleaving   
From Demodulation To Error Correction 
 
that is designed for independent channel errors (short burst) can be used. 
Suppose that L code words are interleaved.  If the original code corrects any single burst of length t 
or less, the interleaved code corrects any single bursts of length Lt or less.  This is due to the fact that 
if a burst error occurs, it is distributed over L code words equally, and appears as independent random 
bit errors.  So, if each code word with a burst error of length t is capable of recovering data, the 
interleaver and the decoder can recover data in a block of code words when single burst error of 
length Lt occurs  [57]. 
A block diagram of a simple interleaving process is portrayed in Figure  2.21.  In this example, the 
input blocks are written horizontally in memory cells, while the output blocks are read out vertically 
(arrows) or vice versa. 
Another type of block interleaver is semi-random interleavers.  The input bits are read out in a  
 
 











Figure  2.22  General structure of a convolutional interleaver 
 
semi-random manner (instead of vertically or horizontally). 
There are non-block interleavers such as convolutional interleavers that consist of n parallel lines 
with various digital delays.  The input bits are sequentially written to the lines and the output is the 
bits which are synchronously read from the lines.  Figure  2.22 depicts the structure of a convotional 
interleaver  [77].  Generally convolutional interleavers have a better performance in terms of delay and 
overall Bit Error Rate. 
If the delay in each line of the convotional interleaver is increased by one, the interleaver is called a 
Declined Interleaver.  Declined interleavers are utilized to reduce the delay and jitter caused by the 
interleavering process.  Figure  2.23 is a block diagram of a simple declined interleaving process.  The 
input blocks are written horizontally in the memory cells where they have been shifted (or delayed) 
incrementally, and are read vertically (arrows). 
 
 










2.6 Security Services 
Many of the protocols in communication systems do not provide security.  Tools to "sniff" passwords 
on the network are in common use by malicious hackers.  Thus, applications which send an 
unencrypted password over the network are extremely vulnerable.  Worse yet, other client/server 
applications rely on the client program to be honest about the identity of the user.  Other applications 
rely on the clients to restrict their activities to those which they are allowed to do, with no other 
enforcement by the server. 
There are four concerns that a security system can address  [11] [78]:  
• Confidentiality 
• Authenticity  
• Data integrity 
• Non-repudiation 
Confidentiality is the protection of transmitted data from attackers with respect to the release of 
message contents.  Usually, this is done by encryption functions which transform the message into 
unreadable information.  The function has a property that only someone in the possession of a specific 
key can reverse the effect (decryption) and recover the message.  With no knowledge of the key no 
one can extract the message from the unreadable information by using reasonable feasible resources 
 [11], which means it is computationally safe.  Therefore, if the sender encrypts all private messages 
before transmitting them through an insecure channel, only the receivers that know the specific key 
can extract the original message.   
User Authenticity is a process where a user establishes the right to an identity; that is, in essence, 
the right to use a name.  There are a large number of techniques that can be applied to authenticate a 
user, including passwords, biometric techniques, smart cards, and digital certificates; the last of which 
is used widely in cryptosystems  [81]. 
Even after a user is authenticated, it is necessary for the data that is sent to be checked continuously 
to verify that it has been sent by the authorized user.  Due to the use of unreliable communication 
channels, it is likely that the received data has not been sent by an authorized (expected) user or data 
source.  The eavesdropper, the attacker of the system, can change the message that has been sent 
through the channel or even completely replace it with a new message.  To protect the system from 
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this kind of attack, data authentication is employed to ensure the integrity of the received message. 
Data Integrity or Data Authentication is a critical component in acquiring and maintaining 
trustworthy data.  When it is transferred between locations where it can be intercepted and/or 
substituted, the potential for unlawful modification of the data exists.  Data authentication is a 
cryptographic technique used for detecting this modification or replacement.  Note that the data 
authentication does not change the data in any way (i.e., the data is not encrypted); rather, adds an 
authentication tag that accompanies the data.  Generally, data authentication algorithms are used to 
detect unauthorized modifications, both intentional and accidental, to data. Hashed Message 
Authentication Control (HMAC), digital signatures are examples of protocols that can be used in data 
integrity. 
Non-repudiation prevents legitimate parties, involved in a communication, from denying its 
existence or the contents of the data they sent.  Thus, when a message is sent, the receiver can prove 
that the message is, in fact, sent by the alleged sender.  In a cryptosystem, this is usually handled by 
digital signatures.  It indicates who has signed the data, and ensures that the contents have not been 
altered, and is also used as a means of user identification.  In schemes, where digital IDs have been 
assigned to all authorized parities in the communication, a certificate is issued to authenticate the 
valid users and their public keys.  These are commonly referred to as Public Key Certificates.  They 
and their infrastructure, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), are briefly explained in the next section.   
Digital signature and encryption systems are expected to become an essential part of doing business 
via digital links.  Based on a range of encryption techniques, digital signature systems allow people 
and organizations to electronically certify such features as their identity, their ability to pay, or the 
authenticity of an electronic document.  Policies governing the collection of information for digital 
signatures, and the architecture and legal liabilities associated with these technologies, raise important 
privacy and consumer protection issues.  Encryption and authentication are discussed in the next two 
sections. 
2.6.1 Encryption 
Encryption is the process of encoding information with a key in such a way that only the user (or 
computer) with the specific key and process algorithm can decode the encryption.  Encryption 
algorithms are characterized in two categories: symmetric-key and asymmetric-key encryptions, as 
illustrated in Figure  2.24  and Figure  2.25  [11].   
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In a symmetric-key algorithm, the encryption key is related to the decryption key in the way that 
they are identical or there is a simple transformation between the two keys.  The keys, in practice,  
Same Keys
Key: K Key: K
 
Figure  2.24  Symmetric key cryptography 
 
 
Figure  2.25  Asymmetric key cryptography 
 
represent a shared secret between two or more parties that want to maintain a private information link.   
For Symmetric-key algorithms there are two formats: stream cipher and block cipher  [11].   
In the latter, a block of plaintext is treated as a whole and used to produce a ciphertext of equal or 
greater length as signified in Figure  2.26.  This is convenient when dealing with stored data or data 
processed by a computer. 
As shown in Figure  2.27, in a stream cipher, a digital data stream is encrypted one bit or one byte at 
a time.  This is a convenient form when the data is already present as a serial data stream, such as in 
the serial transmission systems. 
As mentioned, stream ciphers are a type of symmetric encryption algorithm.  Stream ciphers are 
designed to be exceptionally fast, much faster than any block cipher.  Block ciphers operate on large 
blocks of data, and stream ciphers, typically, operate on smaller units of plaintext, usually bits.  The 
encryption of any particular plaintext with a block cipher results in the same ciphertext, when the 
Key: K1 
Asymmetric-Key 
Encryption Algorithm Plaintext: P  Ciphertext: C
Key: K2
Asymmetric-Key 
Decryption Algorithm Plaintext, P 





Decryption AlgorithmPlaintext: P  Plaintext, P Ciphertext: C
 
33 
same key is used.  With a stream cipher, the transformation of these smaller plaintext units varies, 
depending on when they are encountered during the encryption process.  A stream cipher generates 
what is called a key stream (a sequence of bits used as a key).  Encryption is accomplished by 
combining the key stream with the plaintext, usually with the bitwise XOR operation, illustrated in 
Figure  2.27.  
The disadvantage of symmetric-key algorithms is the requirement of a shared secret key, with one 
copy at each end.  Since keys are subject to potential discovery by a cryptographic adversary, they 
need to be changed often and kept secure during distribution and in service.  The consequent 
requirement to choose, distribute, and store keys without error and without loss is difficult to achieve 
confidently. 
Some examples of popular and well-respected symmetric algorithms include: AES (aka Rijndael) 
 [82], Blowfish  [83], CAST5  [80] [83], IDEA  [84], RC4 [83], Serpent  [85] [81], 3DES  [86], and 
Twofish  [85].  In 2001, the Advanced Encryption Standard algorithm was approved by NIST  [81].   
Asymmetric-key encryption is also known as a Public key cryptography.  Typically, it allows users 
to communicate securely without having access to a shared secret key.  This is accomplished by using 

























mathematically  [11].  Such keys enable users to make some parameters, including the encryption key, 
public.  If the users want to send an encrypted message to a member of the public key system, they 
can take the corresponding public parameters of the member and encrypt their information with them.  
The public key schemes ensure that only those, whose public parameters are used for encrypting the 
information and possess a unique secret key, can decrypt the information (Figure  2.28).  Also, the 
scheme ensures that by knowing the public information and possessing the encrypted data, it is 
computationally infeasible for some one to decrypt data without knowledge of the secret parameters 
and secret key.  There is no need to say that the public and secret parameters are securely correlated, 
that is, for each member #i and each message P, the following 
gm(i)( fm(i)(P ) ) = P   
is valid. 
Typically, public key algorithms are computationally complex, compared with many symmetric 
key algorithms of equivalent security.  In practice, this means that a quality asymmetric key algorithm 
is hundreds or thousands of times slower than a quality symmetric key algorithm.  Examples of well-
regarded public key techniques include: the Diffie-Hellman, ElGamal, Elliptic Curve encryption 
algorithm (ECC), and RSA encryption algorithms  [11] [80] [81] [83].  Symmetric-key algorithms 







Figure  2.28  Typical public key scheme 
 
2.6.2 SAC Property 
Far more effort has gone into analyzing block ciphers.  They are applicable to a broader range of 
applications than stream ciphers.  The vast majority of network-based conventional cryptographic 
applications make use of block ciphers.  Accordingly, the concern in this chapter and the discussion 
throughout the thesis is solely on block ciphers. 
A desirable property of any encryption algorithm is that a small change in either the plaintext or the 
key should produce a significant change in the ciphertext.  In particular, a change in one bit of the 
plaintext or one bit of the key should produce a change in many bits of the ciphertext.  This is called 
the avalanche effect  [11] [87].  If the change is small, this might provide a way to reduce the size of 
the plaintext or the key space to be searched  [88].  This concept can be extended to Strict Avalanche 
Criterion (SAC), where changing a single bit in an information-block results in changing almost half 
of the bits on average in the output block  [11].  If a cryptographic function is to satisfy the strict 
avalanche criterion, then each output bit should change with a probability of one half, whenever a 
single input bit is changed.  The SAC was introduced by Webster and Tavares  [116].   
 This is also true for decryption.  If a small change occurs in the ciphertext, the plaintext, produced 
by that ciphertext and the correct key, should not be similar to the original plaintext as seen in Figure 
 2.29.  In this way, an attacker cannot estimate the plaintext by examining different forms of the 
ciphertext.  Due to this property, if a channel error occurs in the ciphertext, the recovered plaintext is 
corrupted.  This is why, when cryptographic functions such as encryption are employed, the 
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sensitivity of the system to errors increases, and it is crucial that the blocks which are delivered to the 










Figure  2.29  SAC property, plaintext 1 and 2 are different in only one bit. Bits with the same 
position in ciphertext 1 and 2 are different with probability of 1/2 
 
2.6.3 Data Integrity Checks 
Data integrity checks in secure connections are performed by either digital signature or hash 
functions.   
Typically, digital signatures are more complex and require more processing power compared with 
hash functions.  Digital signatures also provide non-repudiation services as well, and are used to 
detect unauthorized modifications of the data and to authenticate the identity of the signatory.  In 
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send a signed message to Bob.  She produces a hash value of the message, raises it to the power of     
addition, the recipient of the signed data can use a digital signature for proving to a third party that the 
signature is, in fact, generated by the signatory.  This is known as non-repudiation since the signatory 
cannot, at a later time, repudiate the signature. 
A hash function is an essential element in digital signatures, and is present in almost all digital 
signature algorithms.  As shown in Figure  2.30(a), Hash function, H(.), is a one-way function with a 
SAC property which converts any arbitrary length input to a fixed output size  [11].  The output of the 
hash function is referred as the hash value.  It is obvious from a mathematical perspective that there 
are many inputs that have the same hash value (Collision, Figure  2.30(b))  [11] [78] [89].  One of the 
key properties of hash functions is that it must be computationally difficult to find two inputs which 
have the same hash values.  SHA-1 and MD5 are examples of hash functions.   







Figure  2.30  Hash function: (a) a collision in hash functions occurs when the hash values of 
two different inputs are identical and (b) keyed hash function 
 
In the next sections a few well-known digital signature schemes are explained.  Also it is 
demonstrated how hash functions are used in signature generation and verification processing. 
2.6.3.1 RSA Signature 
In addition to public key encryption, RSA is employed to sign a message.  Suppose Alice wishes to 
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2.6.3.2 DSA  
tional Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)  [81] published the Digital 
d into 
lated to signature schemes that have 
be
ch that p=qz+1 for some integer z and such that 512 ≤ L ≤ 1024 
• − 1 such that g = hz mod p > 1. 
Pub  k  is x. 
sh Algorithm, SHA1.  Note that FIPS-186-2, change 
no
L 
d mod n (as she does when she is decrypting a message), and attaches the resulting number as a 
signature to the message.  When Bob receives the signed message, he raises the signature to the 
power of e mod n (as he does when he is encrypting a message), and compares the resulting hash
value with the message's actual hash value.  If the two agree, Bob knows that the author of the 
message is in possession of Alice's secret key, and that the message has not been tampered with
Anyone can verify a signed message, but only someone in possession of the correct private key ca
sign a message.  By using RSA, authentication occurs without any sharing of private keys: each user
uses only other's public key and/or his own private key  [11].   
In 1994, the Na
Signature Algorithm (DSA) in the Digital Signature Standard (DSS).  DSA is being incorporate
a number of systems and specifications.  A minor revision was issued in 2000 as FIPS 186-2  [90], and 
the standard was expanded further in 2006 as FIPS 186-3  [91]. 
The DSA is based on the discrete logarithm problem and is re
en proposed by Schnorr and ElGamal  [81].  Although RSA can be used for both encryption and 
digital signatures, the DSA can only be used to provide digital signatures.   
The Key Generation to establish a DSA digital signature scheme follows: 
• Choose a 160-bit prime q. 
• Choose an L-bit prime p su
and L is divisible by 64. 
Choose h, where 1 < h < p 
• Choose x by some random method, where 0 < x < q. 
• Calculate y = gx mod p. 
lic ey is (p, q, g, y).  Private key
The DSA standard specifies the Secure Ha
tice 1 specifies that L should assume the value 1024 only, and the FIPS 186-3 uses SHA-224, 
SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 as a hash function, q of size 224, 256, 384, and 512 bits with 





od q, where H(m) is the hash function applied to the 
• e signature in the unlikely case that r = 0  or  s = 0 . 
The r
 either 0 < r < q  or  0 < s < q is not satisfied. 
od q . 
) mod q . 





ve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is a variant of the DSA which is based 
on
To sign a message m, the following steps are taken
• Generate a random value k where 0 < k < q
• Calculate r = (gk mod p) mod q . 
• Calculate s = (k -1(H(m) + x*r)) m
message m . 
Recalculate th
• The signature is (r, s) . 
 ve ification is as follows 
• Reject the signature if
• Calculate w = (s)-1 mod q . 
• Calculate u1 = (H(m)*w) m
• Calculate u2 = (r*w) mod q . 
• Calculate v = ((gu1*yu2) mod p
• The signature is valid if v = r . 
gnature verification is much faster than the signature generation (if the public and private exponen
respectively, are chosen for this property, which is the usual case  [92]).  It might be claimed that it is 
advantageous for the signature to be the faster operation, however, since in many applications a block
of digital information is signed once, but verified often, it might well be more advantageous to have a 
faster verification.  Wiener has explored the trade-offs and issues involved in DSA  [93].  There has 
been work by many authors, including Naccache et al.  [94], on developing techniques to improve the
efficiency of DSA, both for signature and verification.   
The Elliptic Cur
 Elliptic Curves  [81].  Elliptic curve cryptosystems (ECC) were first proposed independently by   
V. Miller  [95]  and N. Koblitz  [96].  At a high level, ECCs are analogs of the existing public-key 
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rity of all public-key cryptosystems, the security of ECC relies on the underlying 
di  
o 





ants to send a signed message to Bob.  Initially, the curve parameters (including 
ge t 
ign a message m, she follows these steps 
er k from [1,n − 1] (nonce). 
 0, select another nonce and calculate r 
• te s = k − 1(e + dAr) (mod n).  If s = 0, select another nonce and recalculate s and r. 
To authenticate Alice's signature, Bob must have a copy of her public key QA.  He proceeds with 
th
fy that r and s are integers in [1,n − 1].  If not, the signature is invalid. 
cryptosystems in which modular arithmetic is replaced by operations defined over elliptic curves 
 [11] [81] [83].   
Like the secu
fficult-to-solve mathematical problems.  The security of such systems depends on the following
hard problem: Given two points, G and Y, on an elliptic curve such that Y = kG (i.e., Y is G added t
itself k times  [11]), find the integer k.  This problem is commonly referred to as the elliptic curve 
discrete logarithm problem. 
Presently, the methods for 
ficient than those for factoring or computing conventional discrete logs  [11].  As a result, short
key sizes can be used to achieve the same security as that of conventional public-key cryptosystems
Recently, ECC has attracted the attention of both the academic community and industry. 
Elliptic curves can be also used for digital signatures.  The next few paragraphs summa
DSA scheme.   
Suppose Alice w
nerating point G) must be shared  [11] [80].  Also, Alice must have a key pair, suitable for ECC tha
consists of private key dA (a randomly selected integer in the interval [1, n−1] ) and public key QA 
(where QA = dAG). 
For Alice to s
• Calculate e = H(m). 
• Select a random integ
• Calculate r = x1 (mod n), where (x1, y1) = kG.  If r =
again. 
Calcula
The signature is the pair (r, s). 
e following. 
• Veri




nd  u2 = rw (mod n). 
). 
The ion speed in ECDSA.  For instance, it is possible to 
ca
2.6.3.4 Public Key Certificate  
tity certificate) is a certificate, where a digital signature is 
co ame of 
astructure (PKI) scheme  [11] [81], the signature is of a Certificate 
Au ate) 






and needs to be renewed. 
• Calculate w = s − 1 (m
• Calculate u1 = ew (mod n)  a
• Calculate (x1, y1) = u1G + u2QA. 
The signature is valid if x1 = r (mod n
re are techniques to increase the calculat
lculate u1G + u2QA faster by using Straus's algorithm (a.k.a.  Shamir's trick) than to calculate the 
sum by using conventional scalar multiplications  [97]. 
A public key certificate (or iden
mbined with a public key.  Therefore, public keys are binned with an identity, such as the n
a person or an organization, and their addresses.  Thus, the certificate can be used to verify that a 
public key belongs to a user. 
In a typical Public Key Infr
thority (CA).  In a secure network, the signature is either that of the user (a self-signed certific
or of other users (endorsements).  In either case, the signatures on a certificate are authenticated by 
the certificate issuer such that the identity and the public key are combined. 
Figure  2.31 conveys how a CA is used to establish an authenticated private
CA member, wants to establish an authenticated secure channel to Alice, another member of CA.  
First, he sends his ID (IDBob) and public key (PKBob), along with his certificate (SignCA(IDBob, PKBob) 
to Alice (1).  Alice verifies the integrity of Bob’s ID and public key by using the membership list of 
the CA, and verifying CA’s signature on Bob’s ID and public key (2).  Then, she generates a random
number (nonceAlice) and encrypts it with Bob‘s public key.  She sends her ID, public key, and her 
certificate, with the encrypted random number and her signature on it, to Bob (3).  After Bob’s 
verification of Alice’s ID and public key (4), he generates his own random number and encrypts
using Alice’s public key (5).  At this time, both Alice and Bob can decrypt the received random 
numbers and generate a shared key (session key) by using a pre-defined function in the network (
Then, the session key is used to encrypt the rest of the communication.  In some networks, the session 
key might change several times during a communication.  Also, the certificate itself has a life time 
 
42 
Fig re communication of the Certificate Authority (CA) 
scheme 
 
Digital signatures are widely used to protect cure e-mail systems  [98] [99]. 
2.
In wireless networks, there are several protocols and standards.  Typically, wireless protocols are 




.  Since all the wireless 
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ure  2.31  Authen ication and secut
data in se
7 Wireless Application Protocol Architecture 
implemented in the physical and transport layers.  The Wirele
architecture  [100] is shown in Figure  2.32.  The wireless bearer deals with the actual connection o
the devices.  The primary concern is to change the bits to signals that can be sent to the antenn
Channel coding and signalling techniques are implemented in this layer.   
The transport layer involves flow control, error detection, error correction, retransmission, Mult
Accessing (MA), and carrier sensing to increase the transmission reliability
vices share the transmission medium to send and receive information, collision detection and 
collision avoidance must be employed in the transport layer.  The transaction layer manages the data 
and creates the data packets. 
In the next section, a few energy conservation techniques, to extend the mobile devices’ battery-
life, in secure wireless networ
(1)
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2.8 Energy Costs and Security Requirements 
In order to use security services, the system requires more algorithms and specific processes that 









ally strong key for each of the rounds.  Key setup is another issue which must be 




Figure  2.32  Wireles (WAP) architectu
results in time and energy costs increase.  Setting up the sec
data delays the transmission, and performing the security processes consume additional energy.  
When the security processes are included in time and power limited systems such as battery-powered
mobile handheld devices, these costs significantly increase.  The energy cost is the most importan
performance metric in wireless networks that consist of limited energy resource devices, such as 
WSN (Wireless Sensor Network)  [101] [102], WLAN (Wireless Local Area Network)  [103], and 
WPAN (Wireless Personal Area Network)  [104]. 
Also, it has been demonstrated that a system using security services can consume almost twice t
energy of a system which does not use the service 
inimize the energy consumption of the security services.  P.  Prasithsangaree et al. have 
concentrated on the symmetric-key algorithm  [106], and Potlapally et al.  [107] has studied the pow
consumption of asymmetric-key algorithms.  The energy cost of different AES modes has 
shown in  [106].  The AES in the Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode consumes less energy than 
Cipher Block Chaining (CBC), Cipher FeedBack (CFB), and Output FeedBack (OFB) modes 
( [11] [80] [106]). 


















tion as well  [106].   
entication Code (MAC) generation/verification using SHA-256, data 
en
ployed 
mobile device where a 
se
 
nd a Compaq iPAQ H3670 Handheld is used as the client, 
is at 
Table  2.2  Energy cost of different digital signature algorithms 
Scheme Key Size Signing Verifying 
nsidered.  Symmetric-key algorithms usually run for several iterations of a substitution and/or 
permutation on their input to produce the output  [11] [80].  Since different algorithms require differe
key setup operations, the energy consumption of the key setup should be taken into consideration
 [106]. 
In some applications, the trade-off between energy consumption and the security services’ streng
is an op
A thorough study has been conducted by Karri et al.  [108] who have considered the total energy 
needed for the Message Auth
cryption/decryption, transmission/reception. They have compared a system with security enabled 
services with the same system when all the security services are disabled.  A more detailed 
description of the test bed and measurement results can be found in   [109]. 
Security can be provided at different layers of the protocol stack.  Karri et al.  [110] has em
IPSec security protocol to measure the increase in energy consumption of a 
cure connection is maintained and compared their results to the non secure connection.  WTLS, as 
security provider for WAP services, has been explored in  [92] where the time efficiency of different
asymmetric-key algorithms is compared. 
Also, the energy costs of digital signature algorithms have been measured  [105].  A client-server 
communication, where the server is a PC a
 explored.  Table  2.2 lists the energy costs of various digital signature algorithms at different steps 
that setup  [105]. 
 
RSA 1024 546.5 mJ 15.97 mJ
ECDSA 160 134.2 mJ 196.23 mJ
 
As mentioned, the most s are andh s, a irable to shift the heavy 
co putation and time consuming processes to a fast server.  For a digital signature protocol, a 
ha
constraint  on h eld device nd it is des
m




ing the 1024-bit RSA and 160-bit ECDSA digital signature scheme:  
• 2-both sides use ECDSA, and  
• 3-Slower party, the handheld device uses ECDSA to sign and RSA to verify messages and the 
and ECDSA to verify and sign, respectively. 
 
Table  2.3  Total energy used in client and server on performing one digital signature and one 
verification 
Since the total energy for signing and verification can be minimized on a handheld device, the 
handheld device must consume the minimum energy and time to perform the ongoing digital 
signature scheme.   
Table  2.3 summarizes the energy consumption based on the results on  [105] and  [111] for th
different cases by us
• 1-both sides use RSA,  
fast party, the server, uses RSA 
Sign and Transmit + Receive and Verify a Signature 
Scheme Key Size Handheld Server 
RSA/RSA 1024 563.82 mJ 563.82 mJ 
ECDSA/ECDSA 160 330.65 mJ 330.65 mJ 
RSA/ECDSA 1024/160 150.95 mJ 743.51 mJ 
 
It can be seen that the RSA/ECDSA scheme has the lowest energy cost for handheld devices.  The 
efficiency of RSA/ECDSA scheme on more platforms has also been studied by Daswani  [92]. 
co
ion 
Also, the processing power limit affects the required time for performing complex calculations of 
such algorithms as digital signatures.  Since, the hybrid RSA/ECDSA scheme shifts the heavy 
mputation processes to the server, the handheld requires less time to generate or verify a digital 
signature than the other schemes.  H. Little  [111] measurements have demonstrated that the hybrid 
RSA/ECDSA can run 20% faster than the ECDSA for the digital signature generation and verificat
as indicated in Table  2.4. 
By considering both the reliability and security, different protocols can be defined to maximize the 
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liability and the minimum transmission power channel needed to achieve the QoS.  By 
ex  
kberry 
device  [111] 
overall performance of a s
cryption.  Rivest  [112] has introduced chaffing and winnowing in order to achieve confidentiality 
without using encryption.  There, the transmitter and the receiver share a secret key that is used 
keyed-hash function.  The transmitter sends real and fake messages.  For the real messages, the 
transmitter calculates the hash value and attaches it to the message.  For the fake messages, the 
transmitter sends a packet of random bits.  The receiver compares the hash it calculates with the 
values that are received, and retains only the messages where the hashes match.  In this way, an 
attacker cannot determine which packets are the ones of the real message.  One of the interesting 
advantages of this technique is that it can be used in the network’s lower layers such as the Data 
Layer.  Also, Chaum  [113] has developed a data reordering technique to obtain confidentiality.  In
this technique each packet contains unencrypted data and an encrypted order number.  Although the 
mixed ordered packets are not meaningful, the receiver with the shared key can recombine the 
packets back in the correct order by decrypting the order of the packets.  This transposition can be 
carried out on an even finer level such as portions of bytes or bits.  A hybrid approach of chaffin
winnowing and Chaum’s order mixing concept, has also been included to create more confusion 
 [114].  Privacy can be further improved by increasing the resources of the system.  For example, 
Simov et al.  [115] have reported that privacy can be provided in multi-channel systems without us
encryption. 
The mobility of devices and time-variant characteristics of a channel in most wireless connections 
affects the re
amining the power needed to maintain the QoS and security level in a wireless communication, the
investigation described in this thesis, is an attempt to devise techniques to conserve energy.   
 
Table  2.4  Client and server time on performing digital signature and verification on a Blac
Scheme Key Size Handheld Server 
RSA/RSA 747 ms 747 ms 1024 
ECDSA/ECDSA 160 118 ms 118 ms 
RSA/ECDSA 10  24/160 98 ms 767 ms 
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2.9 Summary 
There are more concerns about wireless channels than wired channels.  The wireless channel 
e variant.  Changes in the transmitter’s or receiver’s location, speed, or direction; 
vironment’s temperature; and the movement of nearby objects directly affect the 
reless 
y 
  The principal concepts of two renowned decoding 




variations in the en
characteristics of the wireless channel.  In this chapter, the models which are a better fit for wi
channels, their categories, and the different techniques which are used to handle the errors in a 
connection are explored.   
In addition, the structures of the error handling techniques and their codes are reviewed, since the
are used in the proposed models later in Chapter 3.
odels. It is also demonstrated how different techniques can be used to reduce the energy 
consumption in Turbo Code channel decoders.  Moreover, the effect of the security functions on the 
performance and the energy consumption of the systems is studied.  In the next chapter, the 
modification of the decoding algorithms and the newly devised error handling technique to






Retransmission Reduction in Secure End-to-End Wireless 
Communication 
Applying security functions such as privacy, authentication, and digital signatures on a wireless 
connection increases the error sensitivity and overhead and decreases the overall performance of the 
communication system.  An increase in error sensitivity is primarily caused by the security functions; 
a single residual bit error in a received block of encrypted information renders the entire block 
unreadable  [11] [117] [118]. 
In applications which require secure end-to-end wireless connection, the complexity is increased to 
obtain a higher level of reliability and system performance.  The added complexity affects various 
aspects of the communication.  In this thesis, it is proven that under certain conditions of the 
communication channel the overall performance of the system improves by increasing the 
complexity.   
In this chapter, a number of techniques are presented to achieve better performance in a secure end-
to-end wireless connection by reducing the number of retransmissions such that the energy 
consumption for retransmission is reduced.  This is especially important in wireless mobile devices 
such as cell phones and PDAs which have a limited access to energy. 
3.1 Retransmission Rate Reduction Techniques 
In most communication systems, such as TCP/IP, ARQ schemes are used to augment reliability.  As 
explained in Section  2.2.2, such techniques are based on the retransmission of corrupted packets by 
sending back a negative acknowledgment to the sender.  The receiver must use error detection coding 
techniques to highlight the corrupted packets.  Such codes add more bits to the transmitted packet.  
When the received packets are likely to have few bit errors, HARQ [Section  2.2.3] techniques are 
usually used.  They decrease the number of retransmissions by reconstructing the correct information 
from the corrupted packets  [59].  This leads to better delay characteristics at the expense of more 
overhead and complexity. 
In these systems, the message cannot be delivered until either a correct copy arrives at the receiver 
end or it is recovered from the errors, which increase the average delay of the system.  The aggregate 
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throughput of the system with retransmission depends first on the number of retransmissions and 
secondly, on the packet overhead  [59].  Generally, more retransmissions lead to a lower throughput, 
higher average delay, and higher energy consumption. 
In the next section, a technique, which uses the principle of channel coding to reduce the number of 
retransmissions when the communication channel is noisy, is described.  By avoiding 
retransmissions, the communication system attains a higher throughput and better delay 
characteristics. 
3.1.1 K Best Likelihood (K-BL) Block Decoder 
Noise in a channel introduces errors in the transmitted information in such a way that it might not be 
decoded into a correct block in the receiver.  When the ratio of the receiving signal power to the 
channel noise power, SNR, decreases, more blocks are likely to be decoded incorrectly.  In other 
words, the probability that the number of errors occurre in one block is higher than the correction 
capability of the channel decoder increases.  To deliver error-free messages in the ARQ, the receiver 
must request the sender to retransmit the block each time an error in the decoded blocks is detected.  
In HARQ systems, the retransmission is requested when the number of errors in the decoded block is 
larger than the number of correctable bits.  In this case, the rate of the block retransmission goes up, 
and the delay and throughput characteristics of the communications system deteriorate.  When the 
receiver detects uncorrectable errors in the decoded block, it is possible that the receiver checks a few 
other probable blocks before discarding all the information of the decoded block.  If any of the 
probable blocks is the correct one, the receiver avoids sending retransmission requests to the sender.   
For the realization of this system, a channel decoder, which produces K best likelihood (K-BL) 
blocks after receiving a codeword from the channel, is chosen.  Note that for K=1, the channel 
decoder is exactly the same as that of a conventional channel decoder which outputs only the 
maximum likelihood block. 
The probability that the correct block appears among the K best likelihood decoded blocks is higher 
than or equal to the probability that the correct block is actually the best likelihood decoded block.  In 
the other words, 
Probability (correct block = maximum likelihood decoded block) ≤   





To prove this inequality, let Pi denote the probability that the correct block being decoded is the ith 
maximum likelihood block in the K best likelihood channel decoder.  According to this definition, the 
probability that the correct block being decoded as the maximum likelihood block, is P1, such that 
Probability (correct block = maximum likelihood decode block) = P1 . (3.2) 
This is the probability that a conventional channel decoder delivers the correct block.  The 
probability that the correct block appears among the K best likelihood decoded blocks is the 
summation of the all Pi s from 1 to K.  Thus, 







Considering 0 Pi≤ 1 and K≥ 1, it is concluded that ≤






∈{K-BL decoded blocks}). (3.4) 
 
This indicates that the probability that the K-BL channel decoder delivers the correct block is either 
equal to or higher than the probability of the correct block being decoded by a conventional 
maximum likelihood channel decoder. 
The K probable blocks in the output of the K-BL channel decoder can contain the correct block.  
The blocks which contain errors must be detected and eliminated so that the system delivers the 
correct block, if it appears in the K probable blocks.  From here on in the thesis, the blocks in the 
receiver that contain errors, are called spurious blocks.  In fact, there is either K-1 or K spurious 
blocks among the K probable blocks.  To eliminate the spurious blocks, an error detection technique 
must be used.  It can eliminate the spurious blocks and find the correct block among the probable 
blocks.  Therefore, a system, enhanced with an error detection algorithm as depicted in Figure  2.13, 
can examine the probable blocks to find the correct block.  After failing to pass the error detection 
process, the spurious blocks are eliminated.  The system delivers the block that passes the detection 







Figure  3.1  Communication system using K-BL channel decoder and error detection 
 
In practice, error detection techniques might not detect the errors in the block.  Consequently, it is 
probable that more than one block successfully passes the error detection process.  In this case, the 
block with the higher likelihood probability is delivered.  If none of the blocks passes the detection 
test, the system’s control unit should request retransmission of the block as the last resort.  Figure  3.1 
is a diagram of a system with the K-BL channel decoder. 
The performance of the model in Figure  3.1 depends on the accuracy of the error detection process.  
In next section, a technique, which improves the error detection capability in the receiver, is 
introduced.  It uses the characteristics of the security functions to gain more detection power.  Also, 
further explanations to develop an error detection technique, which is limited to legitimate receivers 
only, are presented.  This improves the reliability of the communication for the legitimate receivers 
and increases the confusion for the unauthorized receivers.   
 
3.1.2 Private Error Detection (PED) 
Error detection techniques are not ideal, and they can miss the detection of a spurious block.  The 
spurious block, which passes the detection algorithm without being detected, is called  false positive 
whose probability is denoted as Pf+,. 
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Due to the error occurrence in the parity bits, sometimes a correct block is rejected by the detection 
algorithm and is mistakenly considered as a spurious block.   
Different detection techniques have different rates of false positive.  To lessen the probability of a 
false positive, more parity bits must be included which increases the overhead of the system 
(decreasing the throughput).  There is always a trade-off between the overhead of the parity bits and 
the accuracy of the detection algorithm  [59].  Generally, if the patterns of the errors in the blocks are 
random, each extra parity bit cuts the probability of a false positive by half  [11]. 
Usually, the data transmission is in a block format; for example, when the communication medium 
is shared.  Consider a data stream from a source.  To form a block, the source data is segmented.  The 
size of these segments must be in a range which is determined by the block format.  In most 
communication systems, the receiver performs error handling techniques on each received block; that 
is, the receiver checks each block of data individually and independently.  Therefore, to combine the 
cryptographic functions with error handling techniques, block ciphers are more suitable.  The reason 
is that the data in each block can be encrypted independently, and the errors in one block are not 
necessarily extended to those in other blocks.  It is assumed that each block contains the encrypted 
message, along with the added parity bits which are used in error detection and error correction as 
portrayed in Figure  3.2.   
The role of encryption is to conceal the contents of the messages from unauthorized receivers.  
Consequently, the encryption algorithms should have certain characteristics.  One of them is the Strict 
Avalanche Criterion (SAC)  [11] [78] [80] [116].  It is possible to use the result of security function in a 
data integrity check process to enhance the error detection capability.   
Assume the transmitter sends message m to the receiver and it is changed to m’ at the receiver end.  
The change can be caused by noise, distortion, or any imperfection in the channel.  Now, let fSAC(.)  
 
Ekey(m) p1 Bits 
 
Figure  3.2  Example of a block used in secure reliable communication 
 Parity Bits for 
Error Detection 
 




represent a Boolean function with the SAC property, which accepts any arbitrary length of the input 
and converts it to a p1-bit block.  According to the SAC, if any bits of the transmitting message m are 
changed in the channel, the probability that fSAC(m) matches fSAC(m’) is (½) p1.  On the other hand, if 
the p1-bit output of fSAC(m’) matches the p1-bits output of fSAC(m) then the message is decoded 
correctly with a probability of 1-(½) p1.  By generating the p1-bit output of fSAC(message) and sending 
it with the message, it is possible to detect errors at the receiver end with a probability of 1-(½) p1 
 [58].  In this detection technique, only the SAC property of the fSAC(.) is used.  Therefore, any 
function with the SAC property can be used in this technique. 
In practice, each transmitted block of information contains several parity bits for the detection 
process.  If the encryption of the blocks and/or the parity bits is not used, unauthorized devices can 
detect the correct blocks with the same efficiency and reliability as the authorized devices.  If the 
parity-bit check algorithm uses a key to examine the correctness of the message, the error detection is 
only available to the parties that possess the correct key.  This leads to a technique in which the error 
detection capability is granted only to the authorized receivers.  The unauthorized receivers cannot 
check the correctness of the decoded message through the parity bits produced by the keyed data 
integrity function. 
Since only the receivers who have the correct secret key can use the detection algorithm in this 
technique, it is referred as Private Error Detection (PED) technique.  Also, the output of the keyed 
algorithm with the SAC property is called private parity bits because it is used to detect the error in 
the block of decoded data and they are only useable for the receivers who have the key.  The private 
parity bits provide additional error detection capability to the legitimate receivers.   
As mentioned, encrypted blocks are very sensitive to errors; a single bit error can affect the 
reliability of the whole block.  Now, due to a noisy communication channel, the receiver requires 
additional error handling capability, which can be provided by the PED.   
By using the PED technique, the authorized receiver holding the correct secret key is able to use 
private parity bits to detect and deliver the correct block with a lower probability of false positive than 
that of unauthorized receivers. 
By using the functions in data integrity process and encryption process, PED technique are 
implemented.  Figure  3.3 is a scheme of a communication system which relies on the PED technique.  
In this system the data integrity function is used to implement the PED.  The system with the correct 
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key is capable of including private parity bits to detect the spurious blocks.   
In the systems which already use encryption to hide the contents of the transmitted block, the same 
functions can be used to conceal the private bits.  In this case the private parity bits have fixed values, 
simplifying detection.  It is noteworthy that the addition of the fixed bits or related bits in the 
encrypted block might reveal some information about the secret key in some cryptosystems.  Figure 
 3.4 represents the flow of data in a system which uses data privacy functions (encryption and 
decryption) to implement the PED technique.  In this figure, the private parity bits are assumed to be 
all zeros. 
As shown in Figure  3.4, all of the decoded blocks are fed to the decryption process after they are 
processed by the detection algorithm.  After decryption, the private parity bits of blocks will be 
checked to detect errors.   
If the PED technique is used in parallel with another error detection technique, such as the CRC, 
the overall error detection of the system becomes more accurate.  Figure  3.5 shows how the PED can 






Figure  3.3  PED technique implementation using data integrity function in (a) sender and 








































Figure  3.4  Flow of data in a system with PED technique implementation using data 
privacy functions in (a) sender and (b) receiver 
 
 
Figure  3.5  System which uses PED along with another error detection technique 
 
If there are p1 bits assigned as a private parity, the probability of the delivery of a spurious block, 
false positive, reduces  times.  The following equation shows the relation of the false positive 
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Pf+, using PED = 
12
1
p  Pf+, without PED. (3.5) 
The enhancement of the error detection capability, provided by PED, is gained at the expense of a 
higher overhead caused by private parity bits and complexity.  The numerical simulation results in  
 Chapter 4 verifies that in certain channel conditions the overhead which is added by the private parity 
bits is far less than the overhead that is caused by a retransmission in the system with a less accurate 
error detection technique.   
Also, since the implementation of the PED technique involves security functions, which are already 
used in the secure communication, the complexity and energy consumption of the sender and receiver 
are not changed dramatically.   
3.1.3 Application Layer Pre-Coding and Interleaving 
Generally, it is desirable to recover correct messages even after the receiver fails to decode the 
received packet correctly.  The problem in an end-to-end secure connection is that the security 
function (e.g., decryption) converts a spurious block with a few error bits to a complete random block 
in the application layer.  This block then acts like a burst error. 
Burst errors are common in communication systems with fading channels.  Usually, the fading 
effect is caused by multi-path, scattering, or blockage of the transmitted signal.  Fading deteriorates 
the quality of the signal in the receiver for several bit times.   
Principally, error correction codes are designed to correct a few randomly positioned errors in the 
block.  Generally, they cannot correct burst errors, if the error size is more than their correction 
ability.  Therefore, when a transmitted packet is affected by a burst error completely, block error 
correction techniques cannot recover the information, and the receiver has to request a retransmission 
of the packet. 
However, there is another solution.  With an interleaver, a burst error can effectively be distributed 
over several blocks.  That is, an interleaver can be used to reduce the effective size of the burst errors.  
The erroneous bits appear in several blocks but are in much smaller size.  Now, an error correction 
code can be designed to recover the correct information.  Error correction codes are broadly used in 
different communication protocols and standards.  The codes are well known and well studied, and 
often have straight forward implementation both in the software and hardware environments.  Thus, 
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pre-coding and the interleaving technique are used to recover the information in burst affected blocks, 
if the number of encrypted blocks with errors is not high.   
The computation time and memory size are increased but the performance is improved.  Better 
performance results in lower retransmission rates, which in turn, reduces the overall delay of the 
system in a noisy environment, that is a low SNR.  For the added overhead, the pre-coding and 
interleaving is smaller than that of other coding techniques.   
Let us assume that in the transmitter, l1 blocks of code (n1, k1) are interleaved, before they are 
delivered to the encryption unit in the application layer.  The combination of a coding module with s1 
bit correction ability and an interleaver of l1-block depth is capable of recovering error-free data from 
blocks with a single burst error of maximum length of (l1-1)s1+1 bits  [119].  If the burst error 
consistently begins at the beginning of a block and ends at the end of another block, the maximum 
length of the correctable burst error increases to l1s1 bits. 
In the receiver, after decryption, the blocks are de-interleaved and decoded by the pre-decoder to 
extract the message  [119].  Figure  3.6 signifies how this technique is implemented to correct burst 
errors before delivering the message. 
If there are any spurious blocks among the n1 blocks after passing the decryption process, the bits 
of the spurious blocks randomly change.  For example, if a spurious block is delivered to the 
decryption process, individual bits of the output block will change with a probability of ½ 
 [11] [80] [119].  It can be said that each spurious decoded block acts like a burst error of length of n1 
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number of spurious blocks in the input of de-interleaver is not more than ⎣ ⎦111 nsl  bits, where  is 
the largest integer less than x, it is possible to recover the message without errors. 
⎣ ⎦x
With a fixed s1, the maximum length of the correctable burst error is determined by the ratio of the 
interleaver’s depth and span; that is, l1/n1.  Although the larger ratio of the depth to the span size of 
the interleaver increases the correction capability of the system, the decoding delay is higher.  On the 
contrary, the implementation of the declined interleaver with same depth and span size is very easy in 
systems with block format data, and also has better delay characteristics.  Therefore, declined 
interleavers with the same depth and span are commonly used in practice. 
The pre-coding and interleaving technique can be adopted in HARQ systems with a bursty channel 
to reduce the number of retransmission by recovering burst errors.  If the retransmission cost, in terms 
of delay and energy consumption, is higher than the cost of the extra overhead of the technique, the 
communication system’s performance is improved by conserving energy and enhancing delay.  These 
parameters are very important in real-time applications on battery-powered devices. 
Figure  3.7 portrays how the information in a decrypted spurious block is recovered by pre-coding 
and interleaving technique.  To improve the jitter characteristics of the system, a declined interleaver 
is used.   
In contrast to conventional block interleavers which need to fill their memory before outputting the 
interleaved blocks, a declined block interleaver outputs an interleaved block as soon as a block is 
received.  A simple interleaving method is presented in Figure  2.21.  The best ratio of the de- 
interleaver’s depth (n1) and span (l1) is a number close to 1 for the coding and interleaving 
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technique fixed error correction capability (s1).   
If it is assumed that this technique is implemented in the applications layer, then, by using the 
interleaver and pre-decoding, the error occurs only if there are more than s1 blocks of error in n1 
consecutive blocks.  The probability of error improves according to the following.  

















where and Pe  are the probability of block errors before and after the de-interleaver and pre-
decoding, respectively.   
1eP
In the next section, a model that includes all of the previous techniques is introduced.  In the next 
chapter, it is shown that although coding and interleaving increase the mean delay and overhead, the 
overall performance of the model is better than that of the base model with certain values of SNR.   
3.2 Model 
Figure  3.8 denotes the model which uses all the techniques that are previously discussed.   
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It is assumed that the data source generates information in the form of messages of k1 bits.  Figure 
 3.9 conveys the flow of the data in block format at the transmitter end of the model. 
As shown in Figure  3.9, each message is first encoded by the pre-coding C1 (n1, k1) code that maps 
each message to a block of n1 bits.  Then, l1 blocks are interleaved together to form n1 blocks of 
length of l1 bits in such way that each block in the output of the interleaver contains only one bit of 
each block that has been delivered to the interleaver.  Consequently, the system has the capability to 
recover the correct messages from s1 spurious blocks among l1 blocks, where s1 is the burst error 
correction capability of the combined pre-coding and interleaving.  To improve the delay 
characteristics, a declined interleaver is used in the model. 
After interleaving, p1 bits of private parity are added to each block, changing the length of the 
blocks from l1 to l2 (=l1+ p1) bits.  These parity bits are used to detect spurious blocks only in an 
authorized receiver, as discussed in Section  3.1.2.  The blocks are then processed by the encryptor 
which outputs encrypted blocks of length k2 bits.   
The encoder parity bits adder appends p2 bits of parity to the end of the block.  These bits are used 
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increases to k2 (=l2+ p2) bits.  The channel encoder then encodes the block by using the C2 (n2, k2) 
codes and produces codewords of length n2 bits.  These codewords are sent to the receiver through the 
channel. 
Figure  3.10 reflects the structure of the sent packet in the model. 
In the receiver, all of the processes are reversed.  Figure  3.11 shows the process of decoding in the 
receiver.  First the received codewords are delivered to the channel decoder, where the K best 

































l2 = l1 + p1  bits
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In addition to delivering the probable blocks, the channel decoder associates each block with a 
metric.  It is a scale that shows how similar the produced codeword by each block is to the received 
codeword.  It should be mentioned that any bits of the codeword which are affected by the noise on 
the channel, cause the differences.  An example for the metric is the Hamming distance  [67].  In this 
case, the metric related to each block is defined as the Hamming distance of the codeword, produced 
by the block and the received codeword after the hard decision process  [57].  The two types of 
metrics are the distance metric and maximum likelihood metrics  [67].  If the metric is a distance 
metric, the decoded block is most probably the correct block when its metric is the smallest.  But if 
the metric is the maximum likelihood metric, the probability that the decoded block is the correct one 
is higher if its metric is larger.  Assume that the smaller metric is assigned to the block that produces 
an output which is more similar to the received codeword.  Here, the metric is a distance metric.  
Thus, the bigger the metric, the less likely the chance the block is the correct block.  All the metrics 
are reported to the control unit to sort the blocks in a list from highly probable to less probable of 
being the correct answer.  The control unit uses this information, along with other information, to 
decide if retransmission is required.  The control unit is detailed later. 
The channel decoder parity check tests all of the blocks.  If it detects an error, it marks the block 
and notifies the control unit.  Then, the receiver chops P2 bits of the encoder parity bits from the block 
and passes the remaining to the decryption and security function process.  At this time, the lengths of 
the blocks are l2 bits.  All the K blocks are processed by the decryption and security check unit.  The 
spurious blocks appear as a completely random block, after passing the decryption block.  The blocks, 
after the security check, are l2 bits in length of which p1 bits are the private parity bits.  Random bit 
blocks are detected with the probability of ( ) 1211 p− .  After, the parity bits are checked by the parity 
check block, all of the blocks with non-matching private parity bits are marked and the control unit is 
notified.  The most likely block of the remaining blocks is chosen by the control unit to proceed to the 
next level.  The parity bits are removed from the selected blocks.  At this point the blocks are 
delivered to the de-interleaver.  Its output is a block of l1 bits where the bits are interleaved from n1 
consecutive blocks, as seen in Figure  3.7.  These blocks are decoded by pre-decoder block by using 
C1.  The result is a message in k1 bits. 
As shown in Figure  3.13, a cross-layer control unit supervises the performance of the system, and 
controls the retransmission request signal.  The goal of this unit is to minimize the number of 
retransmissions.  After the received codeword is decoded by the channel decoder, the control unit 
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sorts the output blocks by using their metrics, from the best at the top to the worst in the bottom.  
After passing through the channel decoder detection process, all of the blocks that fail are marked and 
dropped to the bottom of the list.  The list of blocks is sorted again by putting the blocks with better 
metrics and no detected errors at the top followed by the blocks with the detected errors.  The 
erroneous blocks are sorted by their metrics.  After, the private parity bit checking, the list is updated 
again in the same manner. 
The block at the top of the list is selected.  If it passes through both detection processes, it is 
delivered to the de-interleaver.  But if the block fails even one of the processes, the control unit needs 
to decide whether to accept the block or reject it, and asks for a retransmission.  This decision is 
dependent on the number of the blocks with detected errors that have been accepted previously.  If the 
number of the blocks with detected errors is less than s1 in the last l1 blocks, the control unit sends the 
block to the de-interleaver, knowing that it is corrected by the pre-coding and interleaving processes.  
Otherwise, the control unit, in Figure  3.12, sends a negative acknowledgement to the sender and 
requests a retransmission.   
 
 
Figure  3.12  Block diagram of control unit 
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In a secure end-to-end communication, the data encryption must be handled by the applications.  
This means that the information is encrypted in the application layer of the transmitter and decrypted 
by the receiving application.  Thus, all the units, before encryption and the security function unit in 
the transmitter, and after decryption and the security function unit in the receiver, are implemented in 
the application layer.  Figure  3.13 indicates the location of the implementation of the different units of 
the model in the WAP architecture model  [100].  Since the control unit requires access to the different 











Figure  3.14 signifies the base model to which the results of the model are compared.  The model is 
the system from the security functions and encryption block in the transmitter to the security checks 
and decryption block in the receiver.  The main difference is that the channel decoder delivers only 
the most probable block (K=1); that is, the decoder has only one output.   The interleaver and pre-


































Decoder Parity Bit 
Check










Figure  3.14  Base model  
 
the block fails the parity bits process before delivering it to the decryption and security functions. 
 
3.3 Analysis 
Before studying different characteristics of the model the parameters that are used throughout the 
analyses need to be defined.  Later, the assumptions and the inter-relationship of the parameters in the 
models are discussed. 
Pi is the probability of the correct block being decoded in the ith maximum likelihood position in 
the K best likelihood decoder.  When the channel noise is very small, compared with the signal, it is 
expected that the channel decoder outputs the correct block in the first position.  Therefore, it is 
expected that P1 >> Pj  for high SNRs, where j ranges from 2 to K.  As the SNR decreases, the 
probability that the correct block appears in the first position (P1) decreases.  Let Pf+ be the 
probability of the false positive in the overall detection process.  Also, let Pc, Pf, and Pd be the 
probability of correct decoding, delivering a spurious block, and not detecting the correct block 
among all K probable blocks in each case, respectively. 
3.3.1 Block Error Rate (BER) 
The channel decoder is the first module that is affected by the channel noise in the model.  Due to the 
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different forms of the received codewords, the K-BL channel decoder can react in three ways.     
In the first case, the number of errors that occur in the receiving codeword is within the designed 
error correcting limit of the channel decoder.  Hence, the decoder can decode the correct block as the 
first maximum likelihood block.  This is accomplished by using the redundancy added by the channel 
encoder in the sender.   
Assume that the probability that case 1 happens is P(K, 1), then 
1)1 ,( PKP =  , 
and the probability of the correct block delivery to the decryption and security check process is 
1 )1 ,( PKPc =  . 
The probability of a spurious code delivery is 
0)1 ,( =KPf  .  
The probability of not detecting the correct block is 
0)1 ,( =KPd  . 
The second case occurs when the channel decoder decodes the correct block not as the first but as 
the ith best likelihood block, where 1<i K.  If this happens during the parity check process, two sub-
cases can occur.  For all j that 1<j<i, either none of blocks in the jth position have the correct parity 
bits, or at least one of them passes the parity check process successfully.  The first sub-case 
guarantees that the correct block is selected.  In this case, the proposed model can avoid the 
retransmissions and has a better aggregate throughput.  But, if the other sub-case occurs, an incorrect 







)2 ,(  , 
and the probabilities of the correct and spurious block delivery are: 





1 1 )2 ,(  , 
and 
( )( ) iKi fij jff PPPKP    1  )2 ,( 2 20∑ ∑= +−= +−=  , 
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where i is the position of the correct block among the K decoded blocks, and  is the probability 
false positive (incorrectly passing a spurious block in the detection process).  The spurious block 
delivery occurs when a spurious block, which is positioned before the correct block, is passed through 
the detection process successfully.  Also, the probability of not detecting the correct block at all,      
Pd (K, 2) is 
+fP
0)2 ,( =KPd  . 
In the third case, the correct block does not appear among the K best likelihood blocks.  The 






1)3 ,(  . 
Again two sub-cases can occur: either all the blocks fail to pass the parity process and the receiver 
requests a retransmission, or at least one of them passes which means that a spurious block is going to 
be selected.  The probability that all the decoded blocks fail in the parity check process is 
( ) )3 ,(1 )3 ,( KPPKP Kfd +−=  . 
The probability of spurious block delivery is 






ff ∑ = +−+−=  , 
and of course, there is no probability that correct block can be delivered, thus, 
0)3 ,( =KPc  . 
It should be mentioned that these three cases cover all the possibilities, that is, 
1)3 ,()2 ,()1 ,( =++ KPKPKP  . 
Thus, the probability that the result of the parity check block is the correct block after decryption 
and the security check is 
)2 ,()1 ,()(, KPKPKP ccsc +=  , 
and the probability of delivery of a spurious block is 
)3 ,()2 ,()(, KPKPKP ffsf +=  . 
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The probability of not finding the correct block and mark all blocks as erroneous is 
)3 ,()(, KPKP dsd =  . 
The de-interleaver and pre-decoding block can recover error-free messages, if the total number of 
spurious blocks and blocks with detected errors are not larger than s1 in an interval of n1 consecutive 
blocks. 
If 1-  is approximated by 1, then +fP






, 1)(  , 







1)(  . 
If the number of detected erroneous blocks is more than s1, the receiver requests retransmission.  
Retransmission rate is calculated as follows:  

















KP  . 
To find the overall probability of error in the message, the probability of block error and block 
correctness, considering the retransmission, are needed.  The probability of a correct block to be 




                                                                                         


























=  . 
Now, the model delivers a spurious message if the total number of spurious and detected blocks in 
n1 adjacent block is more than s1, such that  
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( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )   1 1 )( 1 1
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where l is the number of blocks with errors that are detected, and j is the number of spurious blocks in 
total n1 consecutive blocks in the input of the de-interleaver. 
By looking at Pe(K), it is evident that it increases as Pf, d(K) increases.  Pf, d(K) increases as K 
increases.  This is why a better detection algorithm is required in order to use a channel decoder with 
more outputs, to compensate for the higher probability of false positive.   
The probabilities of a correct delivery, spurious message, and the overall error detection change, as 
K increases.  If the detection process is kept constant (fixed Pf+), the probabilities of false positive 
message, retransmission rate, and correct message delivery change as follows:  
)1()( +< KPKP cc  , 
)1()( +< KPKP ee  , 
and 
)1()( +> KPKP dd  . 
If a PED is added to the system to check the integrity of blocks, the authorized receivers can test 
the blocks with more confidence, lower the probability of false positive.  In this case, the authorized 
receiver can use the K-BL channel decoder without compromising reliability. 
3.3.2 Throughput 
Typically, the aggregate throughput is defined as follows: 
bitsdtransmitteofnumber
bitsmofnumberthroughputAggregate
   
 essage   =  . 
If it is assumed that the size of the acknowledgement packets is much smaller than that of the 
message, their sizes can be omitted in the calculations.  In the models, the number of retransmission 
requests is counted for sending a block of information of n messages of k1 bits with the selective 







=  , 
 
72 
where retP is the number of retransmissions for sending all the messages, and n2 is the size of the 
codewords.  The redundancy, which the pre-coding adds is n1 - k1 = m bits, and the overheads of the 
error detection and PED techniques are p1 and p2 bits, respectively.  Thus, each block, at the input of 
the channel encoder, contains (m+p1+p2) bits of redundancy.  The channel encoder expands each bit 
to 1/R2 = n2/k2 bits, increasing the overall overhead in the transmitted packet to (m + p1 + p2)/R2 bits. 
For the base model, the aggregate throughput is 






=  , 
where retB is the number of retransmissions for successfully passing all the n blocks of information 
through the communication channel in base model, shown in Figure  3.14.  The share of the overhead, 
added by the detection scheme in the transmitted packet, is p/R1 .  The overall overhead, considering 
both the pre-coder and the detection block, is (m +p)/R1 bits. 
When the channel residual error rate is very small, retransmission rarely occurs.  In that case, it is 
assumed that retP and retB are negligible, compared with n, and the ratio of the base model throughput 













  . 
For the value of p1+p2 equal to p, the ratio is 1.  This means in high SNRs (SNR>10dB), the 
proposed model and base model have the same throughput efficiency. 
To compare throughputs, they are normalized by eliminating the constant terms.  Therefore, the 
throughput of the base model and the proposed model are 










=  , 
and 










=  . 
Then, the normalized aggregate throughput is applied to compare the throughput of the proposed 
model with that of the basic model.   
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3.3.3 Delay and Jitter 
The different actions during the error-free transmission of a block require different amounts of time.  
In the base model, if an uncorrectable error in the decoded block is detected, the receiver requests the 
sender to retransmit the block again.  This retransmission takes time, and increases the delay mean 
and variance of the system.  This is especially important if the round-trip time is long, or the energy 
consumption of the transmission is more costly than that of the processing. 
In the newly devised models a selective-repeat ARQ is used by which on receiving a negative 
acknowledgement, the sender backs up to the codeword that is negatively acknowledged and resends 
it.  As defined in Section  3.3.1, the probability of detecting errors in the block is Pd(K).  For a 
codeword to be successfully accepted by the receiver, the average number of transmissions, including 
the original transmission, required is 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) L+−+−+−= KPKPKPKPKPN dddddaverage 1 31 21 1 2  , 
( )( ) (∑∞= −−= 0 1   1 i iddaverage KPiKPN )  , 
and [ Appendix B] 
( )KPN daverage −
=
1
1  . 
Another important factor is the variance of the delay, called jitter.  Its value in the novel models is 
( )





=  . 
By reducing the number of retransmissions, the delay mean and variance characteristics of the 
system are improved, but this reduction comes with the cost.  It adds extra processing, which in turn, 
increases the overall processing time.  It is proven that this trade improves the overall delay 
characteristics of the communication system.  T1 is the interval from the time that the sender transmits 
a codeword till the time that the receiver delivers the message to the de-interleaver, when 
retransmission does not occur.  Also, let T2 be the interval from the moment of the receiver request 
for retransmission till the time the sender has the codeword ready to be resent.  T1 includes all the 
time that the codeword needs to pass through the channel till the time the receiver requires to receive, 
decode, check the parity bits, and decrypt the blocks.  The average delay time for a codeword to be 
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accepted by the receiver in terms of T1 and T2 is [ Appendix B] 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )L+++++++−= 1212121    1)( TTKPTTKPTTKPTKPKDelay dddd  , 
( )
( )











=  , 
( )





+=  , 
and 
( )211)( TTNTKDelay average ++=  . 
The delay variance is 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( 2
0
2
21 )(1  1)( KDelayKPKPTiTiKJitter i d
i










=  , 
and 
( )221)( TTNKJitter Variance +=  . 
These equations indicate that by decreasing ( )KPd , the delay average and jitter decrease.  Also by 
increasing K,  shrinks.  If the time required to process more blocks is considerably smaller than 
the retransmission time, T1 << T2, it is possible to achieve a lower delay average and jitter by 
increasing K. 
( )KPd
Figure  3.15 shows the jitter and delay mean, when Pd is changing, that is, the delay characteristics 
of the system become worse, when Pd is growing.  It can be seen that the system with a higher value 
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Figure  3.15  Increase in the delay mean and jitter when Pd increases 
 
3.4 Summary 
In this chapter, different methods are introduced to decrease the number of the retransmissions in an 
end-to-end secure wireless communication through a channel under noisy conditions.  Also, a model 
which uses all the techniques is proposed. 
In the proposed model, the channel noise is exploited to increase the attacker’s difficulty in 
recovering the transmitted information.  This is accomplished by hiding the parity bits and the 
acknowledgement in the communication.  Although the original message can be left unencrypted, the 
reliability of the decoded information, available to the unauthorized receiver, is lower.  In the 
networks for which processing time is smaller than the time required for the retransmission, it is 
possible to achieve lower number of transmission by using the novel model.  The proposed model is 
best used in wireless environments. 
In the next chapter, the simulation results and a comparison of the aggregate throughput and the 






Energy Conservation and Security Enhancement Techniques in 
Wireless Connections  
In this chapter, novel models, comprised of different techniques to improve the energy consumption, 
and enhance security over a certain range of the channel signal to noise ratio are established by 
reducing the number of retransmissions or avoiding unnecessary iterations.  In addition, a cross-layer 
controller for monitoring the performance of the different parts of the model in the different layers is 
explained. 
In this chapter, the implementation of the K-BL channel decoders is exhibited.  We pursue the idea 
into more details and complete the implementation of proposed models.  Further, simulation results of 
the proposed models are shown and compared with those of the base models. 
For the realization of the K-BL channel decoder, two well-known channel decoders are chosen: the 
Viterbi decoder, and the Turbo decoder.  In the next section, realization of the K-BL decoder by using 
the concept of the Viterbi decoder is described.  Several modifications of the algorithm are applied to 
output the K best likelihood blocks.  In the second section, the implementation of the K-output 
channel decoder is demonstrated by using the principle of Turbo Codes.  The detailed simulation 
parameters of models, along with the results, are presented in following sub-sections. 
4.1 Modified Viterbi Algorithm 
Originally, the Viterbi decoder outputs the maximum likelihood block.  To find it, the decoder 
associates each block with a metric which exhibits the similarity of the codeword generated by the 
decoded block and the received codeword  [67].  Therefore, the better the metric, the more similar the 
decoded block is to the original block.  Depending on the metric type, better metric means differently.  
If the metric is the measurement of the Hamming distance, the smaller its value the better the metric.  
For the maximum likelihood metrics, the larger the value, the better the metrics. 
In the Viterbi algorithm the decoder retains the path of the best metric blocks in each state to find 
the maximum likelihood block  [67].  Figure  2.13 reflects an example of the trellis in the Viterbi 









step of decoding. 
To realize the K-BL channel decoder in the newly developed model, a modified version of the 
Viterbi decoding algorithm is adopted  [119].  Like the original algorithm in which the best metric 
paths and sequences are kept in each state, the modified algorithm holds the paths of the K best metric 
sequences. 
At the end of the decoding, the original algorithm determines the most likelihood block by looking 
at the blocks’ metrics.  The best-metric block is then outputted from the channel decoder.  The 
modified Viterbi algorithm chooses its block similarly.  The algorithm determines K-BL blocks by 
choosing K blocks with the best metric values and outputs them, as represented in Figure  4.2.   
In some implementations, the block of data in the transmitter is forced to end by zeros so that the 
path of the correct codeword ends in a specific state (all-zero state).  Knowing this the receiver has 
extra information for codeword decoding  [67].  Also, this method is similarly used in the modified 
Viterbi algorithm.  Such a method, in the receiver can narrow its selection by the assumption that the 





Figure  4.2  Channel decoder using the original Viterbi algorithm and the modified one 
which outputs K-BL blocks 
 
 
Figure  4.3  K-BL channel decoder using Viterbi algorithm 
 
Figure  4.3 shows the amount of data that is stored at each step of the modified Viterbi decoding 
algorithm.  Each row of the table stores a decoded sequence of bits, corresponding to a unique path.  
Each path links the beginning state to the current state on the trellis  [67].  These sequences are 
accompanied by their metrics which indicate the similarity of the codeword generated by the 
sequence and the received codeword up to the current stage of decoding.  The better the metric, the 
more similar the generated codeword is to the received codeword and the higher the probability that 
the original message looks like the current sequence. 
Obviously, the modified Viterbi channel decoder needs more memory and processing capability, 
increasing the complexity of the receiver.  The memory, the computation power, and the decoding 
time are measured and compared with those of in the base model.   
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Figure  4.4  K-output channel decoder using the modified Viterbi algorithm 
 
To study the performance of the reduced retransmission technique, the modified Viterbi algorithm 
is investigated in the channel decoder of the model in Figure  3.8.  Figure  4.4 offers the schematic of 
the complete proposed model by using the modified Viterbi algorithm in the channel decoder. 
As shown in Figure  4.4, to detect the spurious blocks, a Cyclic Redundancy Code (CRC)  [20] 
detection algorithm is used.  All the receivers can use the CRC error detection.  In the authorized 
receivers, the PED technique is used to detect spurious blocks, along with CRC error detection 
process.  Table  4.1 lists all the irreducible generator polynomials which are used in the CRC with 
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C1 (n1, k1) l1 messages p1 bits C2 (n2, k2) p2 bits
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Table  4.1  CRC parameters used in simulation 














Figure  4.5  Base model using the original Viterbi algorithm 
 
The base model, in Figure  4.5, consists of the original Viterbi algorithm in the channel decoder.   
In the following sections, the models are simulated and their results are compared.   
4.1.1 Simulation 
In the simulations, a shortened Hamming code, C1 ( 2m - 1 - p1, 2m - m - 1 - p1, 3 ), is used in the pre-
coding, where m is the degree of the code generator polynomial, and p1 is the number of the shortened 



































bits.  The shortening is conducted for the purpose of having a preset number of bits, which is 128, for 
encryption.  The Hamming distance of this code is 3 and the code can correct only one bit error, that 
is s1 = 1.   
The interleaver is a declined interleaver with the same span and depth, that is n1 = l1 .  The depth 
(and span) of the interleaver is chosen according to the encryption function input size.  For the 
encryption process the Advance Encryption Standard (AES) or Rijndael algorithm  [82], with a block 
and key size of 128 bits, are chosen.  Prior to encryption, p1 bits of private parity are added to the 
output block of the interleaver, thus, the depth of the interleaver is set to 128 - p1 which implies that                           
n1 = l1 = 128 - p1.  This, in turn, determines the degree of the shortened Hamming code.  Selecting           
2m - 1 - p1 = 128 - p1, yields m = 7.   
The CRC code appends p2 parity bits to the encrypted block which increases the size of the block to 
128+p2 bits, which are passed to a channel encoder.   
For the channel encoder, a convolutional code C2 (n2, k2, 5), with the generator polynomial 
G(D)=[1+D2  1+D+D2] is selected.   This code has a rate of R2 = ½ and its free distance is 5   [67].  
The encoder of this code is exhibited in Figure  4.6.  To return the state of the code to an all-zero state, 
two zero bits are appended to the input block, hence n2=2(k2+2).  The structure of the transmitted 
packet in the simulation is shown in Figure  4.7. 
p1 and p2 are the variable parameters in the study, and the results are reported for different values.  
  
 



























Encoded by C1 (n1,k1) 
Interleaved 
Figure  4.7  Structure of the simulated transmitted packet 
 
The simulated channel is a Rayleigh fading channel.  This model is used, since the wireless 
channels are negatively affected by different effects such as shadowing, fading, and multi-path  [58].  
In the model, the output of the channel is y=a.x+n, where a and n are random variables with Rayleigh 
and normal distributions, respectively, and x is the input of the channel.   
Generally, there are two different channel decoders: hard-decision and soft-decision.  In hard-
decision decoding, the hard-decision of the received signal is done prior to the decoding.  Thus, the 
hard-detection operation is considered a part of the communication channel. Then, the combination of 
the waveform channel and demodulator can be represented as a Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC) 
model, whose results are shown. 
The channel decoder in the receiver uses the modified Viterbi algorithm to find the K-BL blocks 
 [119], increasing the complexity of the decoder.  Computation power, the required decoding time, and 
the memory size are measured as K is increased.  For the simulation results, the range of K is from 1 
to 4. 
Then, the K suggested blocks are checked by a CRC parity check.  If error bits are detected in the 
Encrypted 
CRC Encoded 
Encoded by C2 (n2,k2) 
k1 = 121- p1 bits 
l1 = n1 = 128 - p1 bits 
l2 = 128 bits 
k2 = 128 + p2 bits 
n2 = 2 x ( 128 + p2 ) + 2   bits 
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blocks, they are marked by the control unit.  The receiver then starts decrypting the blocks with no 
errors and in the order of the best metric value.  As soon as the blocks are decrypted their private 
parity bits are checked.  If any block fails the private parity bit check, the block is marked and the 
control unit is notified.   
The control unit monitors the number of erroneous detected blocks (the marked blocks).  
Consistently, it retains the number of spurious blocks, which are delivered to pre-coding and 
interleaving, smaller or at most equal to the correction ability of it, s1, in l1 consecutive blocks.  
Therefore, the probability that the correct bits are recovered by the pre-coding and interleaving 
technique is maximized.   
If the control unit detects more than s1 erroneous block in l1 adjacent blocks, the unit sends a 
retransmission request to the receiver.  The flow of data in the receiver is shown in Figure  3.11. 
Figure  4.8 shows Pi for the K-BL channel decoder by using the K-output Viterbi algorithm for       
K = 4 (for the definition of Pi refer to Section  3.3).  Figure  4.8(a), (b), and (c) illustrate Pi for fast 
Rayleigh fading, slow block Rayleigh fading1, and memory-less BSC channel models, respectively.   
Since the Pi values for i > 1 are never comparable with P1 in a slow block fading Rayleigh 
channels, the added computation cost in the proposed model does not provide additional reliability.  
Thus, the proposed model is not beneficial in channels with slow block fading characteristics.   
In fast fading channels, on the other hand, the Pi’s are comparable in low SNRs, as observed in 
Figure  4.8(a).  But, P1 is much larger than Pi for i > 1, when SNR is more than 7dB.  Since for i > 1, 
the model uses the sum of Pis to improve the performance, it is concluded that the improvement, 
obtained by this model and compared to the base model, is trivial for high SNRs. 












































Figure  4.8  Pi for i = 1 to 4  for the modified Viterbi channel decoder where the communication 
channel is (a) a fast Rayleigh fading channel, (b) a slow block Rayleigh fading channel, and           














Figure  4.8 signifies that when the channel becomes noisy, P1 (the probability that the correct block 
is decoded as the maximum likelihood block) becomes comparable for Pi‘s , where i>1.  The base 
model, in where the original Viterbi algorithm is deployed, can deliver the correct block only when 
P(1, K) happens.  (For the definition of P(i, K) refer to Section  3.3.) 
The concept behind the proposed model is to capture the correct block, even if it is not the 
maximum likelihood decoded block.  The advantage of the novel model appears when the correct 
block is not decoded as the highest probable block, but as the ith probable block where 2 < i < K .  
This is represented by case 2 in the analysis in  Chapter 3 (P(2, K)).  Here, the base model is required 
to send a retransmission request or to deliver an incorrect block, whereas the proposed model can 
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deliver the correct block, if it can eliminate the spurious blocks. 
To recognize the correct block in the K outputs of the modified Viterbi channel decoder, the 
receiver uses error detection techniques.  If it is assumed that the error detection algorithm can detect 
spurious blocks with 100% accuracy, P(1, K) represents the base model probability of delivering the 
correct block.  P(1, K) + P(2, K) is, then, the probability of a correct block delivery in the proposed 
model.  Thus, P(2, K) is interpreted as the advantage of the proposed model over the base model. 
Figure  4.9(a) shows P(1, 4), P(2, 4), P(3, 4) for a modified Viterbi channel decoder with 4 outputs, 
when the channel is modelled as a fast Rayliegh fading channel.  The number of private and CRC 
parity bits are set to p1 = 5 and p2 = 5, respectively.  Figure  4.9(b) shows the same results with the 
same parameters for a Binary Symmetric Channel. 
The behaviour of the P(i, K) probabilities in the models for a soft-decision and a hard-decision are 
the same.  By studying one of them, the conclusions can be extended to include the other one.  Since 
the performance of the soft-decision channel decoder is superior to the performance of the hard-
decision channel decoder, we use soft-decision channel decoder to study the performance of the 
proposed model.   
Now, by considering the soft-decision in the proposed and base models, it can be said that in a very 
poor channel condition, that is SNR < 3dB, the probability of error is too high, and both models fail to 
decode the correct block.  When the channel condition is good, that is SNR > 7dB, the added 
complexity of the proposed model cannot improve the performance of the system.  Under these 
conditions, the performance of the base model is as good as that of the proposed model.  Therefore, 
the proposed model improves only the performance in the region, where the channel condition 
changes from very bad to good, that is 3dB < SNR < 7dB.  In this region, the value of P(2, K) is 
comparable to the value of P(1, K) proving that the proposed model has the better performance. 
The focus is on the channel condition, where the SNR ranges from 3dB to 7dB.  In the next few 
sections, the improvements on the throughput and delay characteristics that are achieved by the 
































Figure  4.9  P(1, K), P(2, K) and P(3, K) for the proposed model where K=4 and p1=p2=5: 
(a) soft-decision and (b) hard-decision channel decoder 
 
4.1.2 Throughput 
Figure  4.10 illustrates the normalized aggregate throughput of the proposed model compared with the 



























Figure  4.10  Aggregate throughput of the proposed model with K = 1 to 4, and p1 =p2 =5, 
compared with the base model with p = 10 
 
the base model in the region that the base model uses retransmissions with a high probability.  It 
occurs when the channel decoder in the base model has an unacceptable probability of failure.   
If the PED is added to the system in order to check the integrity of the blocks, the authorized 
receiver can test the blocks with more confidence than the unauthorized receivers.  This is due to the 
lower probability of a false positive of the overall error detection in the authorized receivers. 
When the channel residual error rate is very small (SNR > 8dB), the throughput of the base model is 
the same as the throughput of the new model.  When the channel decoder fails to decode the correct 
block, the correction ability of the pre-coding comes into play and reduces the number of 
retransmission requests.   
4.1.3 Delay and Jitter 
The various actions during the error-free transmission of a block require different amounts of time.  In 
a HARQ system, if an uncorrectable error in the decoded block is detected, the receiver will request 
the sender to retransmit the block.  This retransmission takes time and increases the delay mean and 
variance in the system.  In the communication system where the retransmission consumes costly 
resources, such as the energy in battery powered mobile devices, and the waiting time in a long 
round-trip connection, the proposed model can improve the performance of the system.  By reducing 
































Figure  4.11  Retransmission rate of the proposed model for K = 1…4 for p1 = p2 = 5, compared with 
the base model with p = 10 
 
the system improve, but with a cost.  More process(es) are added which in turn, increases the overall 
processing time.  Therefore, the newly devised model has an advantage over the base model, when 
the processing capability is not limited. 
Delay average and jitter are directly affected by the rate of retransmission (Section  3.3.3) as 
follows: 
( )
















=  . 
Overall, a channel decoder with K maximum likelihood outputs, parity bits, and pre-coding blocks 
leads to a lower number of retransmissions, and therefore a lower mean delay and delay variance.  In 
some ranges of residual errors in the channel, improved delay characteristics are possible.  Figure 
 4.11 indicates that the proposed models have better retransmission rate Pd(K), and thus, a better mean 
delay and jitter properties. 
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4.1.4 Block Error Rate 
The Block Error Rate (BER) for the different parameters is plotted in Figure  4.13.  The analytical 
results are shown in dotted lines for each value of K.  The bound is not tight when the SNR is high.   
This is due to a higher probability of detection by the CRC, after the trellis decoder is employed in 
high SNRs.  By the same detection algorithm, the probability of a failure rises as K increases. 
As shown in the figures, the block error probability increases when K is increased.  This is due to 
the fact that the number of error detection checkings per receiving codeword increases proportionally 
to K (Section  3.3.1).  However, for the error detection algorithm with a fixed false positive 
probability, the higher the K becomes, the higher the rate of false positive.  In order to compensate for 
the increase in the block error rate, the number of parity bits is increased.  Figure  4.12 shows how the 













Figure  4.12  BER of the proposed model for K = 1, p2 = 3 along K = 2, p2 = 4 and K = 4, p2 = 5 with a 
































































Figure  4.13  BER results of the proposed model for K = 1…4 from the calculation (lines) and 
simulation (symbols) (a) p1=5, p2=3, (b) p1=3, p2=5, (c) p1=5, p2=5, (d) p1=5, p2=7, (e) p1=7, p2=5 
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4.1.5 Security Enhancement 
The private parity bits provide additional error detection capability, which are accessible by 
authorized receivers only.  Therefore, the authorized receivers have a higher reliability level than the 
other ones.  
When the channel noise level is not small (SNR < 5dB), the PED technique plays a key role in the 
system’s performance.  Figure  4.14 traces the advantage of an authorized receiver over an 
unauthorized one.  The Block Error Rate is compared with that of the proposed model with K = 1,    
p1 = 3 and 5, and p2 = 10 - p1 with the base model where p = p1, when the channel noise probability 
distribution is modelled with the fast Rayliegh fading.  Also, it is possible to increase the number of 
private bits, when the total number of parity bits is kept constant ( p1 + p2 = cte.) to fix the error 
detection capability of the authorized receiver and change it for unauthorized receiver. 
4.1.6 Performance Analysis 
The proposed model achieves a better mean and variance of the number of retransmissions by using 
more computational power and memory.  One of the main concerns about the K best likelihood 
channel decoder is the time it takes to decode a received codeword.  Table  4.2 shows the average time 
required for a 2.4 GHz Pentium 4 to complete the decoding process.  For a better comparison, it is 
worth noting that the encoding process takes 0.06 milliseconds by using the same hardware 
[ Appendix A].  Also, the encoding and decoding times are almost the same when the SNR changes 

























Figure  4.14  BER comparison of the proposed model of K=1, p1= 3 and 5, and p2 = 10-p1 




















Figure  4.15  Effect of increasing K on the normalized values of the relative (a) aggregate throughput, (b) 
BER, (c) transmission rate, and (d) decoding time, and memory size to their value in the base model 
 
Moreover, the size of the memory in the decoder increases proportionally with that of K.  This 
occurs because the channel decoder in the proposed model saves the K best paths in the trellis during 
the decoding process (Figure  4.3).  Therefore the memory size doubles as K changes from 1 to 2. 
In Figure  4.15, the results of this study are summarized.  The figures show the increase of 
aggregate throughput, Block Error Rate (BER), computation time, memory size, and retransmission 
rate as a function of K.   All of the values are shown in relation to the values when K=1, which is 
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Table  4.2  Average decoding time in the proposed receiver for K = 1…4 
 K = 1 K = 2 K = 3 K = 4 
Decoding Time (µs) 1203.6 2044.6 2860.3 3679.7 
 
4.1.7 Security Analysis 
In the proposed model, the effect of adding parity bits to the input of the security functions must be 
taken into account.  In some security algorithms, this might weaken the security of the 
communication.  If the attacker knows that the fixed bits are added at the end of each block, it might 
be easier to break the security of the communication. 
Also, if unauthorized receivers know that a block has been accepted, they can conclude that by 
using a channel decoder with the maximum number of outputs, the receiver can decode the correct 
message.  In fact, the only advantage that the authorized receivers have over the unauthorized ones is 
access to the detection bits which do not carry any information about the message bits.  Therefore, by 
knowing that a block is accepted, it can be concluded that the packet is correctly decodable by a 
channel decoder with the maximum number of outputs.  Usually, the rate of the acknowledged blocks 
is correlated to the channel conditions.  Therefore, if the attacker realizes that the blocks are decoded 
with a high probability of success, the conclusion might be that the condition in the channel is good 
and there is no need for additional error detection.  Therefore, the attacker chooses the maximum 
likelihood block, since knowing the probability that the correct block appears in the first output of the 
channel decoder (P1) is high.  In this case, the attacker decoding reliability is almost the same as the 
legitimate parties, and the model cannot further enhance the security of the communication anymore.  
To conceal the information in the message acknowledgements, they can be encrypted, such that it is 
more difficult for an attacker to break the privacy of the communication.   
It is noteworthy that the proposed model only enhances the confidentiality, and does not provide 
one on its own.   
4.1.8 Adaptability 




If the number of private parity bits (p2) increases, the probability that a spurious block passes the 
parity check successfully decreases exponentially.  Since the private parity bits are set in the 
application layer of the sender, it is possible that the receiver’s control unit selects the number of 
private parity bits in the sender’s and receiver’s, permitting the control unit to change the number of 
parity bits according to the channel condition.   
Therefore, the control unit can increase the number of private parity bits, when the channel 
condition is poor, to provide greater error detection to the receiver.  Similarly, when the channel 
condition is good, the receiver requires less error detection capability; and therefore, p2 can be small.  
By selecting a small p2 when accurate error detection is not needed, the error detection overhead 
decreases.  Since the sender can send more data, the model has a higher throughput.   
Also, it is possible to let the control unit select the number of outputs in the channel decoder.  In good 
channel conditions, the receiver does not need to check other probable decoded blocks than the 
maximum likelihood block, since there is a very low probability that the correct block is not decoded 
as the maximum likelihood block.  In these cases, the receiver can reduce K to 1 to reserve energy and 
reduce time in the receiver. 
Thus, during the time that there are more errors, the control unit can select a larger K to increase 
the probability of decoding the correct block.  Similarly, with a lower number of errors, the receiver 
can decrease K to 1.  By increasing K, the receiver needs more error detection capability, because of 
the higher probability of the spurious block (Figure  4.15).  As a result, when the receiver controls the 
number of the channel outputs, it needs to control the number of parity bits as well. 
In addition, the control unit can modify the correction capability of the pre-coding and interleaver.  
This reduces the overhead of the communication and conserves the processing energy at a time when 
channel conditions are good. 
 To avoid a high mean delay and variance over a channel, the results indicate that the optimal 
strategy is to use a channel decoder with a two outputs (K=2) as illustrated in Figure  4.15.  
Consequently, the maximum reduction in delay characteristics is achieved by minimum changes in 
the hardware.  Also, over a range of SNRs, an improvement in the aggregate throughput occurs.  The 
primary drawback to this change is an increase in the hardware complexity in the proposed receiver 
by increasing K.  The complexity grows slightly less than the linear growth. 
Overall, the proposed model which contains the modified Viterbi K best likelihood channel 
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decoder, private parity bits, and a pre-coding and interleaver has a lower number of retransmissions 
and therefore, a lower mean delay and variance of delay.  Over a certain range of residual errors on 
the channel, a better aggregate throughput is achievable. 
 
4.2 K-output Channel Decoder Using the Turbo Code Principle 
Considering the blocks at the end of each decoding iteration in a Turbo Code channel decoder as an 
output, Turbo Code channel decoder can be applied in the proposed model.  Then, the decoded block 
at ith iteration is the ith output of the channel decoder, and K is defined as the maximum number of 
iterations which the channel decoder executes.  Considering the principle of the Turbo Code decoding 
algorithm, blocks with a higher number of iterations are more likely to be the correct block.  Also, the 
probability that the correct block is decoded with fewer iterations increases, if the SNR of the channel 
increases. 
Depending on the system requirements and the channel characteristics, an optimal number of 
iterations exists for the Turbo decoder, which ensures useful information is exchanged and used in the 
Turbo code iterations.  This ensures the best possible block is decoded.  The optimal number of 
iterations is affected by the cost of each iteration.  Depending on the system resource constraint the 
energy consumption or the time required to execute one iteration can be included in the iteration cost 
calculation.  The iterations are more sensitive to energy consumption, when the receiver is a battery-
powered device.  In real-time applications, the mean delay caused by the iteration execution, is the 
dominant factor in calculating the iteration cost.  The cost of the iteration, and the acceptable 
reliability determines the optimal number of iterations. 
Intuitively, with a constant signal power, the higher the noise of the channel, the higher the optimal 
number of iterations.  In order to avoid unnecessary iterations and maintain the acceptable reliability, 
an error detection technique must be used to detect the correct block during the rounds of the 
iterations.  If the correct block appears in an early iteration in the Turbo decoding, the error detection 
process can recognize the correct block and stops the decoder from further decoding iterations.   
In newly developed model with the Turbo decoder, error detection techniques and the PED are 
employed to eliminate spurious blocks and detect the correct block.  If it appears in the early iteration 
rounds, the model delivers the correct block with fewer iterations.  In other words, the number of 
iterations in the Turbo decoder is adjusted by detection algorithm.  This decreases the average number 
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of iterations for the channel decoder, resulting in a lower delay average, and reduces the average 
energy consumption per block.  By providing the error detection to the authorized receiver only 
(PED), the reliability of the communication for unauthorized receiver deteriorates. 
The next section explains how to use the enhance detection capability provided by PED to 
eliminates the unnecessary decoding iterations.   
4.2.1 Turbo Code Iteration Reduction Using PED 
The use of a good detection algorithm in a system with Turbo codes enables the receiver to detect 
the correct block early in the decoding process and avoids running unnecessary iterations.  To do this, 
an error detection technique, which its false positive probability is as small as possible, must be used. 
Figure  4.16 shows how a detection algorithm is implemented without the message encryption in a 
Turbo code system.  This is another way to implement PED technique.  It uses the SAC property of 
the data integrity functions to detect error(s) in the block.  Any data integrity process such as HMAC 
or digital signature can be used in PED.  In the proposed model the PED technique is used to improve 
the error detection accuracy, leading to a higher reliability and better delay characteristics.  Since the 
number of private bits is selected in the application layer, the PED parameters can be adjusted 
adaptively for the conditions of the communication channel.  On the other hand, since the PED 
technique is useable only by the authorized receivers, the accuracy of error detection is not changed 
for the unauthorized receivers.  This means the unauthorized receivers need to run the maximum 
number of iterations over all the conditions of the communication channel which leads to the higher 
delay mean and lower reliability.   
The complete model with the Turbo Codes is presented in Figure  4.17. 
Figure  4.18 displays the base model which is the equivalent of the proposed model without the 
PED error detection. 
In the proposed model, the data is sent without being encrypted.  The only part which is concealed 
from the unauthorized receiver is the private parity bits, generated by the PED.  These bits are used to 
enhance the error detection capability which leads to a reduction in average number of iterations.  
Figure  4.20 shows the format of the codeword sent through the channel.  The performance of the 







(a) Implementation of the PED techniques without the message encryption in the sender 
 
(b) Implementation of the PED techniques without the message encryption in the 
receiver 
Figure  4.16  General scheme of the PED techniques without message encryption in the 
proposed model: (a) sender and (b) receiver 
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To generate p1 bits of private parity bits, the AES algorithm is adopted  [82].  Here, the AES is used as 
the keyed algorithm with the SAC property.  The secret key is shared between the sender and all the 
authorized receivers.  After the message is fed into the AES algorithm, p1-bits of the algorithm’s 128-
bit output are selected as private parity bits.  In fact, any p1 bit can be selected, but the receiver(s) 
should know the bit positions.  The freedom in the selection of the parity bits position adds more 
confusion.  Here, the last p1 bits of the algorithm output are selected as the private parity bits.  After 
the selected p1 bits are appended to the end of the message in the parity bit adder, the CRC parity bit 
adder provides p2 bits of parity to the end of the block. 
The Turbo coder then encodes the block including private parity bits and produces codewords, as 
depicted in Figure  4.20. 
The Turbo coder consists of two Recursive Convolutional (RC) coders with yn = xn+yn-1+yn-2  to 
generate codewords, where yi and xi are the ith bit of the output and the input respectively.  Thus, 
 
 
Figure  4.19  RC used in Turbo Code channel encoder with a generator 
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the generator polynomial is G(D)= 1/(1+D+D2).  Figure  4.19 signifies the implementation of the RC 
coder by using a 2-bit length shift register.  The Turbo Code channel encoder contains a random 
mapping interleaver and two similar RC coders (Figure  2.16).  They generate the codewords at a rate 
of 1/3 as seen in Figure  4.20. 
The channel modulation is Binary Phase Shift Keying (BPSK)  [73] [121].  The communication 
channel is modelled as a Rayleigh fading channel and is described in Section  4.1.1.   
On the receiver’s end, a Turbo decoder uses K iterations to decode the received codeword.  The PED 
and CRC parity bit check examine the integrity of the decoded block after each iteration.  If both of 
them confirm the correctness of the block, the block is accepted and the decoding process is stopped. 
Figure  4.21 illustrates the Pi probabilities of the proposed model in the fast and the slow block 
fading channels.  Since the values of Pi’s for i>1 in the same SNR is bigger in a fast fading channel, 
better performance is expected under this channel condition, which is described in the next sections. 
If a receiver does not possess the PED correct key, the receiver cannot use the private parity bits to 
detect spurious blocks.  Thus, the receiver relies only on the CRC parity bits for error detection.  If 
the size of the CRC parity bits is not enough to provide sufficient error detection capability, the 
unauthorized receiver(s) cannot exhibit acceptable reliability. 
Figure  4.22 depicts the block error rates of the proposed model and the base model.  The figure 
reflects the efficiency of the proposed model in low SNRs.  It is observed that the unauthorized 
receivers have a higher false positive rate.  Only the authorized receivers are able to perform with a 
lower false positive rate, and therefore, a higher reliability.  The CRC error detection process has a 
high probability of a false positive (p2=3).  Therefore, the iterations are stopped before the correct 
block is reached, resulting in a poorer performance, as seen in Figure  4.22.  But, with the appropriate 
error detection capability, the authorized receivers outperform in any fading condition.  This is 













































Figure  4.21  Pi for i = 1…4 for modified Turbo Code channel decoder and (a) fast and (b) slow 
block Rayleigh channel 
 
In a slow block fading channel, the authorized device decodes the transmitted blocks with a 99.7% 
reliability (for p2=9 and SNR=5dB), and the unauthorized devices deliver blocks of information with a 
81.4% certainty.  If the channel is fast fading, the reliability for the authorized and unauthorized 
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Figure  4.22  BER for a maximum iteration of K = 4 and block size of N=130 bits, using private parity 
length of p1 = 0 (base model), 3, 6 and constant p2 = 3, in (a) fast, and (b) slow block fading channels 
 
4.2.3 Throughput 
Figure  4.23 illustrates the aggregate throughput of the novel model, compared with the aggregate 
throughput of the base model under various channel conditions.  Obviously, the proposed model 
outperforms in the region where the base model delivers spurious blocks more frequently, that is,   
1dB<SNR< 6dB.  This occurs when the channel decoder has an unacceptable probability of failure.  
The average number of decoding iterations in the proposed model and base model are depicted in 
















































Figure  4.23  Throughput of the proposed model and base model for K= 4, 12, p1=3 and p2=6 in (a) fast and 
(b) slow block fading channels 
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4.2.4 Delay and Jitter 
The delay mean is a key factor of the performance in wireless real-time applications.  The higher 
the number of iterations, the longer the decoding delay in the system is.  This is why designers of 
practical systems prefer to keep the number of iterations low.  However, lowering the number of 
iterations causes a lower reliability  [73].  Iteration execution takes time and increases the delay mean.  
By reducing the number of iterations, the delay mean of the system decreases.  By using an extra 
error detection capability in the proposed model, the decoding iteration is always stopped at the time 
that the correct block is decoded.  This reduces the average time that is needed to decode a block.  
However, as the blocks need different rounds of iterations to be decoded correctly, the variance of the 
decoding delay becomes larger.  Therefore, this technique is best used in the applications which are 
not sensitive to jitter. 
Figure  4.25 reflects the average number of iterations versus the false positive rate for the receivers 
in the fast and the slow block fading channels.  It can be seen that with the same average number of 
iterations, that is, the same mean delay, a receiver with the PED has a lower Block Error Rate.  Also, 
it is shown that by increasing the SNR the block error rate of the unauthorized and the authorized 
receivers becomes closer and closer.  Therefore, in the case of a high SNR to keep the performance 
difference, the authorized party might want to use other techniques such as chaffing and winnowing, 




















































Figure  4.24  Average number of iterations of the proposed model for K= 4, 12 and p1+p2=9 in (a) fast 
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Figure  4.25  Block Error Rate versus average number of iterations in different SNR and different 
parity detection scheme (K=4) 
 
4.2.5 Security Enhancement  
In order to use the PED technique the input data stream should resemble a random stream to achieve 
the flattened probability of all the possible blocks.  Here, the receiver expects all combinations of bits 
in decoded blocks with the same probability.  This increases the confusion, since there is no 
expectation of receiving any particular message at any time and every decoded message, whether it is 
correct or not, looks like a valid message.  Compression and bit-interleaving techniques can be used 
to convert the input data to a random-like stream  [122]. 
Also, if an unauthorized receiver knows that a packet has been accepted, s/he can conclude that by 
running enough decoding iterations, the correct message can be decoded.  In fact, the only advantage 
of the authorized receivers possess is access to the private parity bits for error detection which do not 
carry any information about the message bits.  Therefore, by knowing that a packet is accepted, it can 
be concluded that the packet is correctly decodable by enough processing; that is, the maximum 
number of iterations.  If unauthorized receivers know that a packet has been accepted, they run the 
maximum number of iterations, and they are sure that the packet is decoded correctly without the 
need of checking for errors.  Then, the adversary decoding reliability is the same as that of the 
legitimate parties.  Also, the adversary can compensate for the delay, associated with high average of 
iterations, by using a faster processor.  Therefore, it is very important to hide the information in 
acknowledgement packets.  By concealing the acknowledgement packet, not only is the reliability of 
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the decoding without the key decrease dramatically, but also, packet reordering can be used to 
strengthen the security  [113]. 
In addition, to increase the confusion by the noise in the communication channel, without 
encryption, the PED technique can be fully implemented at the hardware level of the connections, 
leaving more processing power for the higher levels.  Also, other security protocols, running on a 
higher level of the connection, can co-exist with this technique. 
It can be seen that the unauthorized receiver’s error detection is less accurate (a lower number of 
parity bits) and has a higher false positive probability which deteriorate the performance. The 
unauthorized receiver which does not possess the correct key must run the maximum number of 
iterations to achieve the lowest error probability.  This still does not improve the delay characteristics 
but does enhance the reliability.  If the residual redundancy in the message is not high, the 
unauthorized receivers do not know if the decoded message is correct or not.  If the level of noise in 
the channel is high, it might not be possible for the unauthorized receiver to have a high reliability.  
The low reliability of the unauthorized receivers enhances the protection of the sending information.  
In particular, the low reliability increases the protection against the listening attackers, where a 
passive attacker listens only to the communication to obtain private information. 
The enhancement is only effective when the reliability of the communication is highly dependent 
on the accuracy of the error detection process. 
If the noise level in the channel is low, there is a high probability that the correct block can be 
decoded without using any parity bits.  This is why it is essential to use the PED technique in a noisy 
channel such as wireless channels.  For a low channel noise, the sender can randomly insert some 
false messages with non-matching private parity bits to create the same effect as noise on the 
transmitting blocks.  This merges the PED technique with chaffing and winnowing technique  [112]. 
It is also possible to send the blocks’ order by private parity bits.  The messages can be sorted to 
their original order in the receiver.  If the messages are sent in a shuffled order, only the authorized 
receivers are able to sort the messages into the correct order.  The unauthorized receivers who 
perform the listening attack are not able to correctly order the messages since the receivers do not 
have access to the information in the private bits.  It is noteworthy that in the reordering technique, 




Overall, a channel decoder that combines K maximum likelihood outputs, parity bits and a pre-coding 
block possesses a lower number of retransmissions, and therefore a lower transmission energy 
consumption, smaller mean delay and variance of delay.  Over a certain range of residual errors on 
the channel, a better aggregate throughput is achievable.  Figure  4.23 and Figure  4.24 display that the 
proposed models have a better mean delay and variance properties.  Furthermore, if the number of 
parity bits (p2) increases, the probability that a spurious block passes the parity check successfully 
decreases exponentially.  This provides the freedom to adopt a smaller number of bits to detect the 
spurious blocks in the channel decoder.  The number of parity bits is related to and depends on the 
detection ability of the channel decoder. 
In order to avoid a high mean delay and variance over a channel, the results in this investigation 
show that the optimal strategy is to use a channel decoder with a double output (K=2)  [119].  The 
maximum reduction in the delay characteristics can be achieved by minimum changes in hardware.  
Also, over a range of SNRs, an improvement in the aggregate throughput occurs.  The higher 
aggregate throughput is the result of a smaller number of retransmissions, which in turn leads to less 
transmission energy consumption. 
The principle drawback for this change is the higher probability of receiver failure.  This can be 
compensated for by using more accurate error detection techniques which can be provided by PED.  
Also, the use of the PED gives the authorized receiver the advantage of having the exclusive access to 
the extra error detection capability.  The increase in the hardware complexity in the proposed 
receiver, by increasing K, is a bit better than linear growth. 
In the model with the Turbo Code channel decoder, the authorized devices not only have better 
reliability characteristics but also lower mean delays.  This gives the authorized party an advantage 
over the unauthorized one.  Also, over a certain range of SNR, it is always possible to keep the 
reliability of unauthorized devices lower than the acceptable threshold by using the novel method 





The goal of a wireless communications network is to provide a variety of services, including audio, 
video, and data with high throughput, reliably, and security.  Although reliability and security are 
important, the other performance measures such as delay and jitter are concerns in delay-sensitive 
applications.  In this thesis, techniques are proposed to improve the performance measures for 
wireless networks.  Specifically, the techniques decrease the energy consumption, increase the 
throughput by reducing the number of retransmissions, enhance the security, and decrease the mean 
delay and jitter.  However, improvements are achieved at the cost of increased processing and 
complexity. 
Typically, to increase the reliability of wireless links, parity bits are added to the transmitted blocks 
to detect transmission errors.  With the knowledge of the error detection technique and access to the 
parity bits, unauthorized receivers can detect the correct blocks with the same efficiency and 
reliability as the authorized receivers.  If the parity bit generation involves a secret key, then the error 
detection can only be performed by the parties that possess the correct keys.   
In Chapter three, a technique is introduced in which the error detection capability is granted to only 
the authorized receivers.  Since, in this case, only the receivers who share the correct secret key with 
the sender are able to use the detection algorithm, it is called the Private Error Detection (PED) 
technique.  To generate the parity bits, the output of the keyed algorithm with a SAC property is used.  
The resultant parity bits are called private parity bits, since they can be used by the legitimate users 
who have the correct secret key.  Such bits provide extra error detection capability to only the 
legitimate receivers.   
To improve the link quality and reduce the number of retransmissions, a novel technique, the K 
Best Likelihood (K-BL) channel decoder, is proposed.  In this technique, instead of decoding in 
favour of the Maximum Likelihood (ML) codeword, the decoder provides the K most probable 
codewords (blocks) as the most likely transmitted ones.  Since the set of candidate codewords in the 
K-BL decoder contains the maximum likelihood one, the K-BL performance is expected to be at least 
as good as that of the ML decoder.  However, it is evident that for a range of low Signal to Noise 
Ratios (SNRs), employing the K-BL decoder results in a low retransmission rate, if a proper error 
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detection strategy is devised.  This is due to the fact that the K probable blocks in the output of the   
K-BL channel decoder contain the correct block with a higher probability than that of the ML one.  
Therefore, the system using the K-BL channel decoder has more opportunities to decode the correct 
block.   
To implement the idea of the K best likelihood decoder, the well-known Viterbi decoder is 
modified.  The analysis and simulations demonstrate the probability that the correct block appears in 
the output of the modified Viterbi decoder is higher than that of the original Viterbi decoder in a 
certain range of the SNR. The spurious block terminology is adopted to specify the erroneous 
candidate blocks, delivered by the K-BL decoder.  To detect the spurious blocks, an error detection 
strategy, using the PED technique, is devised.  This technique not only provides additional error 
detection capability to detect the spurious blocks, but also enhances the security.   
Since the decryption process, applied on the spurious block, can create burst errors (due to the 
Strict Avalanche Criterion), an interleaver is required to distribute the burst error among the different 
blocks and deliver them with randomly distributed errors to the pre-coder.  To improve the delay and 
jitter characteristics of the system, a declined interleaver with optimized depth and span is chosen.  
The combination of the declined interleaver and pre-coder helped the system to recover the 
transmitted codewords from the spurious blocks and lower the need for retransmission.   
In a secure end-to-end communication, data encryption is handled by the applications.  This means 
that the information is encrypted/decrypted in the application layer of the transmitter/receiver.  
Consequently, all the units, before encryption and the security functions in the transmitter, and after 
decryption and security functions in the receiver, should be implemented in the application layer.   
In order to meet the secure end-to-end connection requirement, the interleaver and pre-coding 
technique is implemented in the application layer.  This results in the capability to control the added 
overhead by the application layer in an adaptive manner.  That is, when the channel condition is good 
and the probability that a spurious block reaches the application layer is very low, the application can 
eliminate the interleaver and pre-coding technique.  For poor channel conditions, the application layer 
can increase the error correction capability of the pre-coder.  This adaptive control of the overhead, 
based on the channel condition, improves the throughput. 
The introduction of the new K-BL decoder causes more opportunity for spurious blocks to be 
selected as correct.  Due to the limited correction capability of the pre-coder, the delivery of the 
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spurious blocks with high numbers of errors should be avoided.  Consequently, a control mechanism 
is required in order to prohibit the delivery of such blocks to the pre-coder.   
To this end, a cross-layer controller, which monitors the flow of information in the receiver, is 
introduced.  By selecting the appropriate criteria for accepting or rejecting the spurious blocks, the 
novel controller decides whether a retransmission is required or not. 
Based on the proposed techniques, a new model is devised, and its performance is compared with 
that of a conventional model.  Analysis and simulation studies prove there are many benefits of the 
proposed system, some of which are listed next. 
• The proposed model requires fewer retransmissions than the base model.  The reduction in the 
number of retransmissions depends on the SNR value.  For the SNR range of 4~7 (dB), the 
reduction in the number of retransmissions is by 57.1% ~5.3%, respectively.   
• Lowering the number of retransmissions affects the throughput, delay, and the required 
transmission energy.  The transmission energy is especially important in wireless networks, 
where most of the energy of the battery-powered devices is claimed for transmission.  Depending 
on the SNR value, the transmitted energy is reduced by 32.1% for SNR=3dB, and 5.1% for 
SNR=7dB. 
• The proposed system reduces the delay mean and variance, crucial parameters in delay sensitive 
applications. 
• The proposed model achieves a higher throughput.  For instance, the throughput increases by 
42.7% and 5.3% at the SNR values of 3dB and 7dB, respectively.  The higher throughput increases 
the efficiency of the network and allows the network to utilize the applications with higher 
throughput requirements.  A network with higher throughput links has fewer traffic problems 
such as congestion and connection drops. 
• The security of the communication link increases in the proposed model.  The security 
enhancement is the result of applying the PED technique, which prevents unauthorized users from 
readily detecting the correct blocks with the same efficiency and reliability as those of the 
authorized devices.  It is worthwhile to emphasize that the proposed model does not provide 





Table  5.1  Comparison of the proposed model characteristics (K=2) with the base model 
SNR (dB) 
Performance Measure 
3 4 5 6 7 
Retransmission Rate Reduction 154.6 % 57.1 % 21.2 % 11.7 % 5.3 % 
Throughput Increase 47.2 % 33.8 % 20.9 % 11.3 % 5.3 % 
Transmission Rate Reduction 32.1 % 25.3 % 17.4 % 10.1 % 5.1 % 
Computational Work Increase 69.8 % 69.8 % 69.8 % 69.8 % 69.8 % 
 
The previous benefits are summarized in Table  5.1.  Note that the values are given for the K-BL 
decoder where K=2.  Indeed, increasing K improves the performance measures of the proposed 
system at the cost of higher complexity.  However, the investigation indicates that not much can be 
gained if this parameter is increased beyond a certain limit.  An appropriate range for this parameter 
is found to be 2 ≤K≤ 4. 
All the above mentioned benefits are achieved at the cost of increased processing and complexity.  
The proposed scheme adds additional processing.  The main processing burden is on the K-BL 
decoder which provides K-candidate codewords.  As a measure of the complexity, the time required 
for a 2.4 GHz Pentium4 processor [ Appendix A] to complete the decoding is measured.  The results 
show that usually the complexity of the decoder increases linearly with K.  The complexity is almost 
independent of the SNR value.  As another measure, the memory requirement for different values of 
K is considered.  It is observed that the required memory size is also increased linearly with K.  To 
attain an acceptable complexity and good performance, K=2 is found to be proper value. 
 To improve the overall performance of the system, the convolutional code can be replaced by the 
Turbo code.  The proposed ideas are extended to a system which utilizes the Turbo code as a channel 
coding strategy, instead of a convolutional code.  To tailor the proposed K-BL decoder to this case, 
the iterative turbo decoder is restructured in a way to provide K-candidate codewords.  For this 
purpose, a decoded block is declared at the end of the ith iteration as the ith candidate block.   
Typically, the Turbo decoder performs a number of iterations in order to provide the final decision.  
The higher the number of iterations, the longer the decoding delay and the more the processing 
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energy consumption is.  Also, limiting the number of iterations degrades the decoding performance.  
It is desirable to find an optimum number of iterations to meet both the delay and the performance 
requirements.  It is obvious that the number of required iterations depends on the channel noise.  
Therefore, for a higher channel noise, the Turbo decoder needs more iterations to meet the required 
performance.   
To avoid unnecessary iterations, a stopping criterion should be devised.  In this regard, many 
methods in the literature have been proposed.  In the newly devised system, a simple stopping 
criterion is proposed.  This enables the receiver to detect the correct block earlier in the decoding 
process and avoid running unnecessary iterations.  The number of false positives is decreased as a 
result of using such a stopping criterion. 
In the proposed method, error detection and PED techniques are used to eliminate the spurious 
blocks and detect the correct block.  The number of iterations in the Turbo decoder is adjusted by the 
error detection strength.  This results in a reduction in the average number of iterations, and 
consequently, reduces the energy consumption in decoding process and average decoding delay.   
Furthermore, the devised stopping technique leads to an improved security.  Since the number of 
private bits is set in the application layer, the PED parameters can be adjusted adaptively to meet the 
conditions of the communication channel.  Due to the lack of access to the PED parameters, the 
unauthorized users need to run the maximum number of iterations over all conditions of the 
communication channel and that leads to a higher delay mean and lower reliability. 
To examine the advantages of using Turbo codes and applying the concept of the K-BL decoder, 
the proposed model is evaluated and compared with a conventional-based model.  The analysis and 
simulation studies demonstrate many benefits of the proposed system. Some of them are listed next. 
• The Block Error Rate (BER) of the proposed system is much less than that of the base model in 
both the fast and slow block fading channels.  In other words, in spite of using Turbo codes in 
both models, the proposed model outperforms the base one.  This improvement is achieved due to 
using the PED technique.  Increasing the number of parity bits, provided by PED, further 
improves the performance. 
• The aggregate throughput of the proposed model, compared with that of the base model in 
different channel conditions, that is., fast and slow block fading, is higher.  This improvement 
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benefits the system in the SNR range 1dB<SNR< 6dB, in which the channel decoder uses 
maximum number of iterations and retransmissions occur with a high probability.   
• The average number of iterations in the proposed model is fewer than those of the base model. 
This is due to the proposed stopping method.  Since the number of iterations affects the decoding 
time, it is concluded that the proposed model requires less energy in decoding process than the 
base one. 
• The proposed method has more enhanced confidentiality than the base one due the enhance error 
correction provided by PED.  It is shown that with the same average number of iterations, a 
receiver with the secret key has a lower false positive rate.  Also, it is shown that by increasing 
the SNR, the false positive rate of unauthorized and authorized receivers became closer and 
closer.  Therefore, for high SNR values, the authorized party may use other techniques such as 
chaffing and winnowing or reordering to maintain the performance difference. 
Some of the advantages of the proposed Turbo coder system are summarized in Table  5.2.  One of 
the benefits of the novel model is security enhancement.  In order to use the proposed model to 
suppress the unauthorized receivers, the input data stream should look like a random stream with 
uniformly distributed blocks.  Then, the receiver expects all the combinations of the bits in the 
decoded block with the same probability.  This increases the confusion, since there is no expectation 
of receiving any particular message at any time and every decoded message, correct or not, appears to 
be a valid message.  Compression and bit-interleaving techniques can be used to convert the input 
data to a random-like stream. 
 
Table  5.2  Comparison of the proposed Turbo coded model characteristics with the base model 
SNR (dB) 
Performance Measure 
1 3 5 7 
Average Iteration  Reduction 40.5 % 35.2 % 14.2 % 0 % 
Performance (BER) Improvement 24.2 % 2.7 % 1.8 % 0.9 % 
Aggregate Throughput Increment 71.7 % 25.5 % 10.3 % 2.0 % 




If unauthorized receivers know that a packet is accepted, they can conclude that by running enough 
decoding iterations, the correct message can be decoded.  In fact, the only advantage of the authorized 
receivers over others is having access to the private parity bits which do not carry any information 
about the message bits.  Therefore, by knowing that a packet is accepted, it is readily concluded that 
the packet is correctly decodable if the processing is enough; that is, the maximum number of 
iterations.  If the unauthorized receiver knows that a packet has been accepted, he/she runs the 
maximum number of iterations and he/she is sure that the packet is decoded correctly without the 
need to detect errors.  Here, the adversary decoding reliability is the same as the legitimate parties.  
The adversary can compensate the delay, associated with high average of iterations, by using a faster 
processor.  Therefore, it is very important to hide the information in acknowledgement packets.  By 
concealing them, the reliability of decoding without the key decreases significantly.  In addition, 
packet reordering can be applied to strengthen the security. 
It can be seen that the unauthorized receiver error detection is less accurate (the lower number of 
parity bits) and has a higher false positive probability which deteriorates its performance. 
The proposed models achieve better energy consumption by reducing the number of iterations in a 
channel decoder that uses the Turbo decoder and by reducing the number of retransmissions in a 
Trellis channel decoder.  Furthermore, the security enhancement of the novel models is an assessment 
where the enhancement is fully achieved. 
5.1 Suggestions for Future Research 
The following is suggested for future studies. 
• Devise a more complex receiver control unit that can enhance the system performance.  For 
example, selecting the number of channel decoder outputs in an adaptive manner will further 
improve the processing energy conservation.  When the channel is in good condition, the receiver 
can lower the number of K-BL decoder outputs, because the probability that the correct block 
appears as the maximum likelihood one is very high.  The K parameter in good channel 
conditions can even be set to one.  This conserves the processing energy in the receiver. 
• The transmitter can adaptively determine the number of private parity bits, based on the channel 
state information provided by the receiver.  If the number of private parity bits increases, the 
probability that a spurious block passes the parity check successfully decreases exponentially.  
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Since the private parity bits are set in the application layer of the sender, it is possible that the 
receiver control unit selects the number of private parity bits and sends it back to the sender.  This 
gives the newly developed control unit the ability of changing the number of parity bits according 
to the channel condition.  Also, selecting a small number of private parity bits, when accurate 
error detection is not needed, decreases the error detection overhead.  The sender can send more 
data, and therefore, the new model described in this thesis, will have a higher throughput. 
• The adaptivity, changing the parameters, can be applied to the pre-coding and interleaver as well.  
The control unit, based on the channel condition, can change the correction ability of the pre-
coding and interleaver.  This reduces the required overhead and conserves the processing energy, 
at the time that the channel condition is good. 
• In the model, by using the Turbo code, the receiver can change the number of private parity bits 
to control the error detection accuracy.  It can increase the number of private parity bits, when the 
channel condition is poor, in order to provide more error detection capability to the receiver.  
Similarly, the receiver needs less error detection capability, when the channel condition is good, 
and therefore, the number of private parity bits can be small.  This decreases the required 





In this appendix, the detail of the simulations and models software implementations are presented.  
Also the confidence intervals of the results are discussed.  The flow charts of the simulation codes are 
illustrated in the next section. 
A.1 Flow Charts 
The flow chart of the base model and proposed model are presented in Figure  A.1 to Figure  A.4.  The 
data flows of the charts are explained in  Chapter 4. 
Start 
Initializations and instantiations 
- Create a message 
- Encrypt the message 
- Append CRC parity bits 
- Encode the message using pre-coder 
- Pass the message through the interleaver 
- Encode the result by the channel encoder 
- Increment Trans_num 
Add noise 
- Decode the receiving codeword 




Figure  A.1  Flow chart of base model using the original Viterbi algorithm as in Figure  4.5 
- Check the CRC parity bits 
- Decrypt the blocks  













Initializations and instantiations 
- Create a message 
- Encode the message using pre-coder 
- Pass the message through the interleaver
- Append private parity bits 
- Feed the output of the interleaver to 
encryption process 
- Append CRC parity bits 
- Encode the result by the channel encoder
- Increment Trans_num 
- Decode the receiving codeword 
- Check the CRC parity bits of the 
K output of the channel decoder 
- Eliminate all the blocks which 
fails the parity check 
Add noise 
- Decrypt the blocks and check 
the private parity bits 
- Increment Retransmission_counter 
No
- Eliminate all the blocks that 
fails the parity check 
- De-interleave and decode the block 
- Deliver it to the data sink 
- fail_counter = fail_counter+1 mod n2 
- fail_num = currentBlockStatus - fail_vector[fail_counter]
- fail_vector[fail_counter] = currentBlockStatus 
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(fail) 








Initializations and instantiations 
- Create a message 
- Add CRC parity bits 
- Encode the message using Turbo coder 
Add noise 
 
Figure  A.3  Flow chart of base model using Turbo Codes as in Figure  4.18 
 
- Decode the receiving codeword 
using Turbo decoder (K iterations)  
- Check the private and CRC parity 
bits 
- Compare the decoded block 
with the original message  
- Increment  




- Calculate the Block Error Rate







Figure  A.4  Flow chart of proposed model using the K output channel decoder with the Turbo 
Code decoding algorithm as in Figure  4.17 
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- Create a message 





- Add CRC parity bits 
- Encode the message using Turbo coder 
- Decode the receiving codeword 
using Turbo decoder (one iteration)  
- Check the private and CRC parity 
bits 
Add noise 
- Compare the decoded block 
with the original message  
- Increment  
      Retransmission_counter 
No
- Calculate the Block Error Rate 













A.2 Testing the code 
The performance of the program has been checked to ensure the correct data processing of each 
module in the simulation.  The method that is used to test each module is listed as follows: 
• Pre-coder and Pre-decoder 
The C1(n, k) code should be able to retrieve a correct message from a blcok which contains at most 
t bit in error.  The position of the error will be specified by the codeword’s syndrome.  All 
combination of the correctable error is generated by the controlled noise and the Pre-coder and Pre-
decoder have been checked using the model in Figure  A.5. 
 
Controlled Noise 
(max. t bits of error in each block)
 
 
Figure  A.5  Pre-coder and Pre-decoder testing model  
 
• Interleaver and De-interleaver 
Both declined interleaver and de-interleaver can be implemented as a similar module.  To test the 
functionality of the modules, a block of data that contains random data has been used as the data 




Figure  A.6  Interleaver and De-interleaver testing model  
 
 










Data Source  








• Encryption and Decryption Units 
The encryption and decryption units have been tested using a random input and an arbitrary key.  
To ensure the functionality of the units, 50 different key for the iteration of 10000 have been tested.  





Figure  A.7  Flow chart of testing Encryption and Decryption units  
 
• Parity Bit Adder and Parity Bit Checkers 
The PED and CRC parity bit adder and check units have been tested as shown in Figure  A.8.   
 
 
Figure  A.8  Testing the functionality of the parity bit adder and parity bit check units  
 
• Channel Encoder and Decoder 
The performance of channel coder and decoder was checked in the model presented in Figure  A.9.  
This test was used for both Modified Viterbi and Turbo Code channel decoders.  Also the coding and 
decoding process has been compared with hand-calculated results to ensure the correctness of the 
program. 






Fail Parity Bit 
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(max. t bits of error in each block)
 
 
Figure  A.9  Channel encoder and decoder testing flow chart  
 
To check the overall model’s functionality, the program was first tested under the noise-less 
channel condition to ensure the model works properly.  On the next step, controlled errors were added 
to the packets in the channel and the results were checked for integrity in the output of the channel 
decoder.  Also bit errors were added to one of the blocks in the input of the Decryption and Security 
check and the messages were compared to the original message in the receiver.  This test checks the 
performance of the interleaver and pre-coding again. 
A.3  Confidence Interval 
In this section, the confidence interval of the simulation results is explained.  The Confidence Interval 
(CI) is metric to show the repeatability and accuracy of the simulation.  CI of a measurement with 










Where α  is the confidence percentage, Φ  is the cumulative distribution function of the standard 
normal distribution, σ  is the standard deviation of the measured variable, and  is the total number 
of simulation run.   
n
As the total number of rounds in the simulations is set relatively high (1000000), it can be 
concluded from Central Limit Theorem  [125] [126] that the block error occurs according to the 
normal distribution  [127].   
Considering the independency of the block errors in one packet from others, the standard deviation 
of the error can be calculated as )1( pp −=σ , where p is the ratio of the number of times block 
error is observed to the total number of simulation runs. 
Figure  A.10 and Figure  A.11 depict the results in the Figure  4.13 to Figure  4.14 along with their 
95% CI. 
 























































   
Figure  A.11  95% Confidence Interval of the values depicted in Figure  4.13 
 
The 95% Confidence Interval of the throughput figures in Section  4.1.2 are less than 
. 2_ 10
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Figure  A.12  95% CI for BER graphs in Figure  4.22 (a) fast fading, (b) slow block fading c
 
The average number of iterations, presented in Figure  4.24 and Figure  4.25, are calcu




A.4  The Hardware 
The simulation was run on a 2.4 GHz Intel Pentium 4 processor.  The computer has 51
RAM and it runs on the Windows XP Professional Operating System (OS). 
The results in Table  4.2 shows the average time that is required for this system to execute 
algorithm. 
A.5  The Code 
The simulation codes are in enclosed CD.  Please refer to Readme.txt for more details. 
A.6  Classes 
To understand the code faster and easier, the implemented classes that are used in the codes 
below.  In addition, the input(s) and a brief description of the class are presented. 
• "BinSeq.h" 
Input: Sequence length  










































Input: Span and deep of the interleaver 
Instantiates declined interleaver and de-interleaver blocks with the given span and deep size. 
• Parity.h 
Input: Size of the private parity bits 
Instantiates a private parity adder and private parity check blocks. 
• MyAES.h 
Input: Null 
Instantiates the encryption and decryption blocks. 
• Convolutional.h 
Input: Size of the codeword, number of channel decoder output 
Instantiates the channel encoder and decoder blocks. 
• Channel.h  
Input: Null 
Instantiates the communication channel including noise generator function. 
• time.h  
Input: Null 
Instantiates the time measuring functions.   
• CRC.h  
Input: Null 
Instantiates the functions that generate, append, and check CRC parity bit.   
• Random.h  
Input: Null 
Instantiates a uniform random number generator which outputs a random number between zero and 
1  [127]. 
• TurboCPTCRC.h  
Input: Null 
Instantiates the Turbo Code channel encoder and decoder.  The decoder has the stop condition 
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